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ABSTRACT 
In their relations with great powers, Southeast Asian states have long been 
characterized as using hedging strategies. These approaches have evolved within the 
region as an effective alternative to the more traditional balancing and bandwagoning 
policies. This thesis maintains that the hedging approach has only been possible due to 
the lack of power competition in the region. In particular, China’s transformation from 
solely an economic great power to a considerable military power erodes these hedging 
strategies today. This thesis shows that China’s formation of A2/AD zones have 
undermined the long-enjoyed regional primacy of the United States and have laid the 
basis for bipolar competition. As a result, Southeast Asian states have been forced to 
abandon their hedging policies and develop balancing or bandwagoning policies instead. 
Using a comparative case study, this thesis finds that during the past decade the 
Philippines and Vietnam initially shifted their respective hedging strategies to a balancing 
approach, but ultimately reversed their positions and are now bandwagoning with China, 
due to the lack of alternative external supporters. The thesis explores the realist school of 
thought that provides the conceptual framework to explain the likely rationale behind 
these evolving responses.
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Many of the Southeast Asian states’ policies have long been based on maintaining 
security ties with the United States, while enhancing economic cooperation with China. 
This hedging strategy has given Southeast Asian states the decades-long luxury of not 
choosing a clear side in the great power competition. The rapid growth of China’s military 
and its development of Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, however, carry a 
potential for weakening U.S. commitments toward the region, thus undermining its role as 
a security guarantor. This thesis examines whether such a shift is likely to provoke 
Southeast Asian states to abandon hedging practices and lean toward one side or another 
more clearly. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In order to analyze the phenomenon, this thesis provides an overview of the trends 
in China’s military growth and modernization and the U.S. response as well, since these 
developments play a crucial role in determining the Southeast Asian states’ policies toward 
the matter. First, this thesis addresses China’s military advancements and the development 
of the A2/AD concept. In particular, the discussion analyzes the significance of the concept 
from the military perspective and evaluates whether the concept provides the essential 
means by which China can actually challenge U.S. military superiority in the region. 
Second, the research studies the U.S. response in terms of increased power within the 
region to evaluate whether the United States is willing and able to preserve its supreme 
position and power projection capabilities in the region. Finally, the thesis moves to the 
key questions of how the Southeast Asian states are likely to respond to evolving trends: 
How do these states perceive China’s military rise and does it require a significant change 
to the hedging approach long employed by Southeast Asian states? If so, does their strategy 
appear to be evolving toward more balancing against or bandwagoning with China? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The unipolar international system, formed after the end of the Cold War, has been 
challenged by certain emerging regional powers, China being the most notable example. 
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Its tremendous economic growth for several decades gave China status as an economic 
great power. Furthermore, the last two decades have clearly demonstrated how economic 
means can be transformed to provide more political and military capabilities. During this 
period, China has experienced impressive military buildup and is even said to have 
developed a concept to restrict U.S. military access toward certain domains of the Southeast 
Asia region. According to Robert Pape, “superior states often benefit from access to the 
territory of third parties.”1 In other words, the superiority of certain states in terms of 
military power is exactly the ability to project their power on foreign territories. Therefore, 
the development of access denial capabilities by China ultimately challenges U.S. 
superiority, thus carrying the potential to deteriorate the stability enjoyed by the region 
under the unipolar system and provoke great power competition within the region. 
Great power competition is primarily studied from the great power perspective; the 
role of secondary powers and other actors is often undermined, and their perspective much 
less often addressed. Nevertheless, analysis of their policies could contribute significantly 
to understanding the prospects of the future power competition. Great power competition 
is rarely based on direct confrontation and is much more about the expansion of influence 
of those powers over other actors and provoking them to exercise irritant policies.2 
Therefore, the secondary states, often referred as allies or partners, typically play a much 
more important role in the evolving great power competition than is usually ascribed. This 
suggests that the response of Southeast Asian states toward China’s military rise could be 
of a greater importance than previously thought. Their choice of taking either a balancing 
or bandwagoning stance, or even maintaining the status quo policies, could affect not only 
China’s chances to emerge as a regional military power or the United States’ chances to 
counter China’s emergence with an efficient manner but also the stability and the possible 
polarization of the region. 
                                                 
1 Robert Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 
2005): 36. 
2 Hans Morgenthau, “To Intervene or Not to Intervene,” Foreign Affairs 45, no. 3 (1967): 428–33. 
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From the theoretical perspective, the study might be helpful to test the resilience of 
the hedging strategy. The Southeast Asian states have long been known to practice hedging 
policies.3 There are many definitions of the concept and none of them is absolute. Yet, the 
common principle shared by most of these definitions is all about obtaining security 
guarantees from one power, without any bounds on enjoying economic benefits from the 
other. This phenomenon has long been considered as an alternative to the two more familiar 
options of the realist perspective: balancing and bandwagoning. Nevertheless, the hedging 
approach was mostly possible because for decades China’s military capabilities were too 
weak to challenge the United States; thus, the great power competition had yet to emerge. 
Now, since China’s evolving A2/AD capabilities have the potential to restrict U.S. military 
access to the region, the costs of providing security guarantees have become considerably 
higher. Hence, the U.S. commitments are undermined and the credibility of its regional 
security alliances is directly threatened. Consequently, the hedging approach practiced by 
Southeast Asian states may no longer be the most efficient or even rational option after all.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section introduces three bodies of literature that are relevant for the thesis. The 
first section surveys research on China’s military reforms and development of A2/AD 
capabilities and gray zone strategy, alongside the U.S. response and AirSea Battle concept. 
The second section addresses the same trend from the perspective of Southeast Asian states 
and demonstrates their responses. Together, these sections help to identify the key 
independent and dependent variables of the research. Finally, the theoretical section 
addresses the realist school of thought and provides the conceptual framework to explain 
the rationale behind the response strategies of Southeast Asian states. 
                                                 
3 Ann Marie Murphy, “Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: 
Exploring the Linkages,” Asian Security 13, no. 3 (2017): 165. 
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1. Great Power Rivalry 
This section demonstrates how China’s rising military capabilities pose a threat to 
the U.S. interests in the region and how the United States responds to the challenge by 
developing new concepts to overcome the denial zones. 
a. China’s Military Modernization and A2AD Zones 
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China has made major advancements since 
the mid-1990s, which have resulted in increased operational capabilities. It is important to 
understand that Chinese military modernization consists of certain elements, which 
together represent integrated policies, aimed to form anti-access and area denial zones. In 
particular, China’s missile systems are the cornerstone of its warfighting capabilities. 
Provided with extended range and sufficient precision, and diversified for different 
platforms (land, naval, air), the PLA’s missiles can be used in counter-carrier and offensive 
counter-air operations, allowing operational effectiveness unmatched by any other Chinese 
systems.4 The PLA has deployed more than 1,000 short-range ballistic missiles along the 
coastline, and has engineered a significant number of stealthy patrol ships, capable of 
carrying long-range supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles.5 This missile-craft fleet consists 
of a variety of small vessels equipped with anti-ship cruise missiles, forming a different 
approach from the U.S. fleet, which consists of a smaller number of ships that are usually 
much larger and more technologically advanced. Furthermore, the PLA has improved 
targeting capabilities with increased situational awareness capacity, achieved through the 
development of reconnaissance satellites, space-based surveillance systems, onshore over-
the-horizon (OTH) radars, and unmanned aerial vehicles.6 Some argue that China tries to 
integrate advanced tactical missilery, combat aviation, modern surface and subsurface 
combatants, and unmanned aerial vehicles to form a barrier to potential adversaries 
                                                 
4 Mark Stokes, Ashley Tellis, and Travis Tanner, “The Second Artillery Force and the Future of Long-
Range Precision Strike,” in China’s Military Challenge (Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian 
Research, 2012), 127–28. 
5 Aaron Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia 
(New York, NY: Norton & Company, 2011), 218–21. 
6 Friedberg, 218–21. 
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operating within the region.7 The PLA’s advancements are important from not only the 
technology modernization standpoint, but also even more from the revolution in military 
affairs (RMA) perspective, putting major emphasis on the new ways China can use military 
means. The Chinese often refer to these policies as shashoujian or the assassin’s mace, 
which stands for possessing the capability to overcome a far more powerful adversary.8 
Nevertheless, not everybody shares the same perspective. Some scholars argue that 
China’s military modernizations are far from being revolutionary, referring to the 
developments as more evolutionary and sustainable.9 Others qualify China’s military 
advancements by pointing out that China’s rise has been relatively recent; therefore, 
procurement of major inventory equipment is quite logical and should not be seen as a 
revisionist tendency.10 These arguments emphasize that the U.S. capabilities are still 
significantly greater in aggregate terms; however, such views fail to acknowledge that even 
if outweighed, China’s capabilities already provide the means to control its mainland area 
and these capabilities are constantly improving.11 Hence, China’s ability to challenge the 
U.S. dominance of nearby offshore waters has increased indeed. At the same time, PLA 
modernization efforts raise the risks for U.S. military forces operating close to China, 
making U.S. intervention in local conflicts more costly and less likely. 
The significance of establishing the Chinese A2/AD zones becomes even clearer 
when analyzed in conjunction with the Chinese gray zone strategy. This strategy blurs the 
clear distinction between war and peace by effectively staying below the level of war, while 
at the same time using coercive diplomacy and military threats simultaneously to achieve 
                                                 
7 Andrew Erickson, “China’s Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities,” in China’s 
Military Challenge, ed. Ashley Tellis and Travis Tanner (Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian 
Research, 2012), 93–97. 
8 Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2014), 215–16. 
9 Richard Bitzinger and Roger Cliff, “PLA Modernization: Motivations, Directions, and the 
Revolution in Military Affairs,” in China and East Asian Strategic Dynamics, ed. Mingjiang Li and 
Dongmin Lee (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011), 32–34. 
10 James Steinberg and Michael O’Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2014), 118–19. 
11 Erickson, “China’s Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities,” 81–86. 
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narrow political objectives. This approach is based on exploiting the ambiguity to 
undermine U.S. commitments and is further encouraged by U.S. policies, directed to avoid 
risks.12 The strategy incorporates the salami tactics of piece-by-piece progress to overcome 
the red lines and pursue China’s objectives without risking escalation, thus successfully 
preventing intervention by greater powers, such as the United States. Some scholars have 
pointed out that the gray zone strategy is not a new concept or a Chinese invention, and 
many states have been sidestepping “defender redline commitments, employing 
intermediary actors as aggressors and presenting faits accomplis to defenders” in order to 
pursue competitive gains.13 This perspective, however, does not undermine the 
significance of the strategy; on the contrary, it helps to understand the true scope of its 
application. This point is further reinforced by the fact that one of the components of the 
gray zone strategy, the fait accompli, has been used nearly ten times more often than 
publicly declared coercive threats to seize territories during the previous century.14 
b. The U.S. Response 
The analysis of China’s military modernization from the U.S. perspective indicates 
how Beijing challenges U.S. interests in Southeast Asia, making the regional stability, 
currently practiced under the U.S. leadership, questionable. Many scholars who study 
China’s rise mention the still existing capability gap between the United States and 
China,15 and acknowledge that the threat of China overcoming the United States is more 
limited than often supposed.16 Nonetheless, they recognize that China’s A2/AD 
capabilities pose a serious challenge to the U.S. force projection capability into the Western 
                                                 
12 Michael Green and Kathleen Hicks, “Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia: The Theory and 
Practice of Gray Zone Deterrence,” CSIS, 2017, 3–4. 
13 Van Jackson, “Tactics of Strategic Competition,” Naval War College 70, no. 3 (Summer 2017): 39–
45. 
14 Dan Altman, “By Fait Accompli, Not Coercion: How States Wrest Territory from Their 
Adversaries,” International Studies Quarterly 61 (2017): 884–89. 
15 David Gompert and Phillip Saunders, The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in 
an Age of Vulnerability (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), 4. 
16 Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area 
Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” International Security 41, no. 1 
(Summer 2016): 10–14. 
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Pacific,17 even if China’s initial intentions are only defensive in nature.18 Some argue that 
China’s military modernization, A2/AD zones, and convenient precision strike capabilities 
already undermine U.S. deterrence capabilities and push the United States to adapt in order 
to survive inside the denial zones.19 Following the same logic, others conclude that U.S. 
conventional deterrence might soon become less persuasive and effective.20 
The United States has manifested its approach toward the challenge within the joint 
Air-Sea Battle doctrine, developed to respond to the spread of A2/ADs. The concept was 
transformed to the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-
GC), where the U.S. Department of Defense defined how to counter A2/AD environments 
and win the access to overseas regions. The key idea persisted as to put major emphasis on 
developing networked, well-integrated forces, with the ability to attack-in-depth in order 
to disrupt, destroy, and defeat adversary via “the application of cross-domain operations 
across all the interdependent warfighting domains (air, maritime, land, space, and 
cyberspace).”21 Nevertheless, some consider the U.S. response inadequate, since the 
developed concept only represents the operational level and is detached from the 
strategy.22 Moreover, cutting of the defense budget might make it difficult to implement 
the concept.  
2. The Response of Southeast Asian States 
Great power rivalry plays out in Southeast Asia and the states there have a unique 
regional perspective regarding how they respond to China’s rise and U.S. engagement in 
                                                 
17 Hugh White, The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 62–78. 
18 Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” 8–10, 36–41. 
19 Evan Montgomery, “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s Rise and the Future of U.S. 
Power Projection,” International Security 38, no. 2 (Spring 2014): 139–47. 
20 Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, 224. 
21 Air-Sea Battle Office, “Air Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area 
Denial Challenges” (U.S. Department of Defense Archives, 2013), 4–5, http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/
ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf. 
22 Dan Blumenthal, “The U.S. Response to China’s Military Modernization,” in China’s Military 
Challenge, ed. Ashley Tellis and Travis Tanner (Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 
2012), 321. 
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the region. There are three major types of arguments developed by authors studying the 
phenomenon. The first claims that Southeast Asian states tend to balance against China, 
especially after its increased influence at sea that pushes regional states toward defense 
acquisitions and renewed reliance on U.S. protection.23 The second argument maintains 
that many Southeast Asian states tend to bandwagon rather than balance against China as 
a result of its rise.24 Most of the authors, however, treat these arguments as premature and 
highlight that regional states usually refuse to choose from only two options of balancing 
and bandwagoning.25 According to them, Southeast Asian states primarily practice 
hedging strategies to sustain their freedom of choice, meaning they “secure economic and 
security benefits from different partners.”26 This implies that regional states promote trade 
with China, while making themselves open to helping the United States maintain a military 
presence in the region. Some scholars look at the hedging from a slightly different 
perspective, claiming that this strategy allows small states to maximize economic benefits 
while minimizing security risks, because of the increased interdependence of the Chinese 
economy with that of Southeast Asia.27 Others put the accent on the defense cooperation 
with the United States, thus describing hedging as a low intensity balancing against 
China.28 
3. Theoretical Framework 
The following section draws the theoretical framework to provide the bases for 
understanding the rationale behind the policies that Southeast Asian states pursue and for 
                                                 
23 Andrew Shearer, “Southeast Asia and Australia: Case Studies in Responding to China’s Military 
Power,” in China’s Military Challenge, ed. Ashley Tellis and Travis Tanner (Washington, DC: The 
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012), 241–76. 
24 Robert Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2005), 177–208. 
25 Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security 
Strategies,” International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007): 113–57. 
26 Murphy, “Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring 
the Linkages,” 165–83. 
27 Chien-peng Chung, “Southeast Asia-China Relations: Dialectics of ‘Hedging’ and ‘Counter-
Hedging,’” Southeast Asian Affairs, no. 32 (2004): 35–53. 
28 Denny Roy, “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?,” Journal of International 
and Strategic Affairs 27, no. 2 (August 2005): 305–22. 
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providing a capable explanation from the theoretical standpoint. The section focuses on the 
realist school of thought, since the thesis puts major emphasis on the role of power in 
interstate relations. Balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging are discussed as the key 
options that states possess from the perspective of realist theories. 
a. Balancing  
Balancing in the anarchical system is a rational technique aiming at the 
maximization of security. There are two major types of balancing. Internal balancing 
implies strengthening of one’s own military potential, while external balancing represents 
efforts to engage in alliances. Both of them serve as deterrents to ensure security from the 
most powerful actor. Stephen Walt looks at balancing from a slightly different perspective, 
putting major emphasis on the threat, rather than on power, and pointing out that states 
usually balance in response to a threat of which the aggregate power is only one factor 
amongst others, such as offensive capability, geographic proximity, and state’s aggressive 
intentions.29  
Some authors offer a distinction between different types of balancing; arguing that 
hard balancing refers to the use of military power or alliances,30 while soft balancing refers 
to non-offensive, tacit coalitions.31 Others emphasize the importance of non-military 
instruments, such as political alignment, diplomacy, and economic strengthening to define 
soft balancing.32 
b. Bandwagoning 
Bandwagoning is the exact opposite of balancing and implies that states choose to 
lean toward the greater power in order to appease the potential threat and maximize 
security. It is worth noting, however, that bandwagoning implies even more restrictions on 
                                                 
29 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 21–26. 
30 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2010), 113–28. 
31 T.V. Paul, James Wirtz, and Michael Fortmann, Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st 
Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 14. 
32 Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” 8–10. 
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the freedom of action than external balancing does and makes states dependent on the will 
of a hegemon. Walt suggests that bandwagoning makes more sense for weak countries with 
closer proximity to strong and threatening states.33 This logic again refers to the threat as 
a major factor to consider when bandwagoning occurs. He argues that those who do not 
have promising allies are more likely to bandwagon, especially if they believe to appease 
the great power by doing so.34 Others draw the distinction between balancing and 
bandwagoning differently, pointing out that states whose goal is security usually balance, 
while states whose concern is profit, usually bandwagon.35 This notion implies that those 
satisfied with the status quo will balance, while revisionists are more likely to bandwagon.  
c. Hedging 
Hedging is far more flexible than the previous two strategies and provides greater 
space for small powers to pursue independent policies. Hedging grants small states an 
ability to avoid choosing sides between great powers and increases their room for 
maneuver. At the same time, hedging is a relatively new and less commonly agreed upon 
term than balancing or bandwagoning, making it extremely hard to provide an 
unconditional definition. 
According to Evelyn Goh, hedging is different from both balancing and 
bandwagoning since it aims to preserve the existing equilibrium.36 By contrast, balancing 
would focus on preventing power transition and bandwagoning would try to achieve 
revisionist results with the power distribution. Goh suggests that hedging is only possible 
when states are “able to pursue engagement policies concurrently with indirect or soft-
balancing policies,” and avoid choosing one side at the expense of another.37 
                                                 
33 Stephen Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, no. 
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Other authors offer different conditions for hedging, such as: No imminent 
existential threat to the hedgers; no ideological fault lines that force states to form alliances; 
and no scenarios that force states to choose sides, suggesting that any of these factors could 
make bandwagoning a more rational strategy for survival.38 
Some refer to hedging as mainly a product of unipolar systems, arguing that 
hedging helps secondary states to manage threats under the condition of unipolarity, while 
at the same time preparing them for the new threats and opportunities as the system leader 
declines.39 
Most of the literature discussed describes the phenomenon based on the recent 
developments within the Southeast Asian region or at least implies these developments to 
be the primary successful examples of hedging practices. These authors try to come up 
with a definition of the term by generalizing the actual policies pursued by Southeast Asian 
states, and it is hard to find the definition that is clearly derived from a different region or 
period. Therefore, it is often inconclusive to reapply the same definition to the same states 
within the same timeframe. 
Despite recognizing the challenge, I still have to use the same approach and define 
the term based on the Southeast Asian experience. Chien-peng Chung provides a well-
defended description of regional states’ policies as oriented toward maximizing economic 
benefits and increasing regional stability by promoting economic interdependence with 
China, while at the same time helping the United States retain a military presence in Asia 
to enjoy the stabilizing element for sustainable economic growth.40 Chung refers to these 
policies as pragmatic hedging. I use his explanation as the basis to construct the definition 
of hedging as a rational strategy, directed toward maximizing the security guarantees by 
engaging the hegemon’s security policies in order to enjoy the stability of the unipolar 
system, while at the same time preserving the freedom of action to pursue own national 
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interests of maximizing economic benefits. For Southeast Asian countries that means 
increased economic cooperation with China, since it is beneficial for regional states, while 
at the same time supporting the status quo of U.S. primacy by providing base facilities, 
logistics support, and military exercises for the U.S. strong military presenceor at least 
not contributing to China’s military rise.  
D. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The first challenge concerns the difficulty of confirming the actual shifts in foreign 
policies of Southeast Asian states. The strategy of hedging is very flexible and versatile; 
therefore, even if the study finds some significant shifts by the regional states toward a 
more balancing or bandwagoning approach, it might not immediately be clear whether the 
shift is genuine or just part of a hedging strategy. The argument could be made that since 
these states have enjoyed hedging for a long period, the contemporary shifts are also part 
of the same old strategy. To address this problem, a previously provided definition of 
hedging has to be used. This definition is based on the premise that hedging is not about 
changing partners from time to time, but about giving certain partners certain roles, as the 
concept of division of labor would suggest. According to this definition, the hedging 
strategy implies a security cooperation with the existing hegemon, while at the same time 
maintaining close economic ties with other regional actors. From this viewpoint, it 
becomes more evident that a significant decrease in security cooperation with the United 
States, as well as enhanced security ties or diminished economic cooperation with China 
are all signs of certain shifts from hedging toward more bandwagoning or balancing 
strategies. 
The second problem has to do with the correlation and causation issue. Even if the 
study finds significant moves by some Southeast Asian states toward balancing against or 
bandwagoning with China, it could be extremely hard to prove that these developments 
were actually caused by China’s military rise and the evolvement of its A2/AD capabilities 
in particular. The only way to overcome this challenge is to provide a clear explanation of 
the relationship, based on the detailed analysis of the cases and profound reasoning. The 
research uses the realist lens, suggesting that all of the states are rational actors who mainly 
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evaluate the situation in terms of security and put major emphasis on hard power 
capabilities. Consequently, once these actors understand the scope of the challenge that 
China’s A2/AD capabilities can pose to their existing security guarantees, they would 
eventually try to respond using the best possible strategy to maximize their security and 
minimize their costs by either more actively balancing against or bandwagoning with 
China. 
Over the course of this thesis, several hypotheses are examined regarding the 
significance of China’s A2/AD capabilities; the decline of U.S. relative power; and finally, 
the Southeast Asian states’ response. The first hypothesis suggests that China’s military 
rise, even though still far behind U.S. capabilities, is actually a real challenge to regional 
security and particularly the national security of individual Southeast Asian states, 
especially after the realization of A2/AD zones and the introduction of the gray zone 
strategy, which increased the risk of U.S. engagement and undermined security guarantees. 
The second hypothesis proposes that the current response from the United States does not 
provide enough counterweight to reverse the process and lacks the ability to assure its allies 
that their interests will be secure even when the stakes are not very high. As a result of the 
previous two hypotheses, the third anticipates that Southeast Asian states will be more 
likely to make certain concessions to appease the emerging power and move toward 
bandwagoning with China to maximize their security in the long term. On the other hand, 
the counter hypothesis could also be made that the regional states should be determined to 
take a more balancing stance, to provoke more support from the United States and prevent 
China from further advancements on relatively early stage of its military rise. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The thesis primarily employs the case study method to collect substantial evidence 
and analyze the possible changes in states’ policies. First, it provides a brief overview of 
the quantitative data and then moves to closer research of two major examples of Southeast 
Asian nations, the Philippines and Vietnam. The Philippines is an appropriate case, since 
it has long been a U.S. ally. Moreover, it is a maritime country, directly affected by China’s 
A2/AD capabilities in the South China Sea; hence, it would be interesting to evaluate its 
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response. Vietnam, on the other hand, is a mainland state, but it has strong littoral interests 
in the South China Sea, so restriction of U.S. access would still affect its security 
environment. Unlike the Philippines, however, Vietnam could not be considered as a 
traditional U.S. ally, but more as a partner, or an independent actor that definitely does not 
enjoy the same level of U.S. security guarantees as the Philippines does. Hence, it would 
be interesting to compare the differences between the approaches of these two Southeast 
Asian states. 
In order to limit the scope of research, the thesis applies a realist view and mainly 
focuses on the role of hard power, primarily the military, rather than political and especially 
economic implications. Open source data on military capabilities are used to provide 
descriptive statistics and evaluate the ongoing changes in terms of hard power balance 
within the region. Yet, the analysis mainly employs the qualitative method, as China’s 
military modernization is primarily important not because of the quantities of military 
equipment, but the strategy of using these resources together in an exceptional manner. 
The assessment of both the United States’ and Southeast Asian states’ responses is 
based mostly on evaluating hard power indicators. In the case of the U.S. response, the 
research looks for the significant quantitative and qualitative increase in military equipment 
in the region, as well as important changes in command and control systems, that could 
potentially increase the speed and efficiency of the decision-making process and overcome 
the challenges presented by A2/AD zones. In the case of Southeast Asian states, the 
research focuses on evaluating whether existing defense treaties, military bases, quality or 
quantity of military equipment, the periodicity or scale of military exercises, or military 
spending in each case has been significantly affected. In general, these might be indicators 
suggesting the loosening of security ties with the United States, or increasing the security 
cooperation with China. Both of these trends contradict the definition of hedging, thus 
suggesting the occurring changes in the strategy. 
Theoretical causes are used to explain the changes over certain periods. The study 
focuses primarily on the post 1990s, the period when China actually started its military 
modernization programs. The last decade is considered as the period in which China reaped 
15 
the harvest of its military advancements and developed A2/AD capabilities. Thus, the 
major changes in regional states foreign policies should be more visible after this period.  
The research is based mostly on secondary sources such as published books and 
academic articles. These sources are relevant for providing both the theoretical basis and 
qualitative information on the developments. Official documents are also used to offer 
credible information about some otherwise sensitive data. Government documents, as well 
as official statements, are used to demonstrate the intentions and perceptions of specific 
states; however, they are judged primarily on their actions, rather than official statements. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis is organized into four major chapters. The first chapter has introduced 
the topic and the relevant theory, definitions and methodology. Chapter II focuses on 
China’s military advancements and the rationale behind the development and likely 
implementation of its A2/AD capabilities, as well as the U.S. reaction. The chapter 
analyzes the development and realization of China’s A2/AD concept, and tries to come up 
with a contemporary picture of how effective that concept already is and what its potential 
could be in the nearest future. Then the chapter addresses the U.S. response and tries to 
evaluate its credibility in terms of military application in order to demonstrate whether 
American military objectives are yet undermined by A2/AD domains and whether any 
tangible counter measures are being developed. Chapter III, the most important, looks at 
the same events from the regional states’ perspective. This chapter is divided into four 
sections. The first provides a broad overview of Southeast Asian states’ policies. The 
following two sections are dedicated to case studies of the Philippines and Vietnam. The 
fourth section offers a comparison and analysis based on the previous information. Chapter 
IV of the thesis develops a theoretical explanation for the obtained results and offers more 
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II. CHINA’S MILITARY RISE AND THE U.S. RESPONSE 
China has demonstrated considerable progress in terms of its military capability 
development in the last decades, raising the question of a potential shift of power within 
the East Asian region. The ongoing U.S. responses to China’s military modernization and 
expansion leave the impression of addressing only a fraction of the issue, and thus, opening 
up gray zone opportunities. These developments largely shape the strategic framework for 
Southeast Asian nations to pursue their own foreign policies and affect their strategic 
decision-making calculus. Therefore, this chapter provides a detailed analysis of both 
China’s military rise and the U.S. reaction, establishing the foundation for the following 
chapters of the thesis, which examine the responses of the Southeast Asian states. 
This chapter examines China’s military advancements over the last two decades 
and analyzes the development of its A2/AD capabilities and gray zone strategy in order to 
evaluate their impact on U.S. engagement in the Southeast Asian region. The analysis 
suggests that China, even though still far behind the United States in terms of military 
power, has already developed the capabilities that can tremendously increase the cost of 
the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asian regional conflict in the possible event of 
escalation. Furthermore, China has developed the gray zone strategy as a way to use 
coercion without risking escalation, thus decreasing the chances of American engagement. 
The American response so far has mainly been drafted in the AirSea Battle concept and 
has further progressed in the JAM-GC. Both of these documents focus on countering A2/
AD zones, but their effectiveness is still uncertain. Moreover, both represent the tactical-
operational level and are far from providing the strategic outline on the U.S. response, 
suggesting that they do not have much to offer against the gray zone strategy. Even the 
recently developed Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) lacks the capacity to 
address this challenge, leaving the problem unsolved, since China could still use the 
coercive means to make systematic advancements on behalf of the regional states without 
risking an escalation, thus successfully preventing U.S. engagement in the region and 
undermining its security guarantees toward other nations.  
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The chapter focuses on the post 1990s, the period when China actually started its 
military modernization programs. The last decade is especially important, as it is the period 
in which China reaped the harvest of its military advancements and developed A2/AD 
capabilities. The first section discusses these developments and presents the key areas of 
progress for the PLA. The second section focuses on the rationale behind the A2/AD 
capabilities and the evaluation its current status in order to determine how effective China’s 
A2/AD already is and what its potential could be in the near future. The third section is 
dedicated to the political domain of China’s overarching approach, discussing the gray 
zone strategy and the potential threat it carries for the regional security environment. The 
fourth section discusses the U.S. response to China’s rise militarily and evaluates any 
tangible countermeasures that have been developed. Finally, the conclusion sums up the 
major findings of the chapter.  
A. ADVANCEMENT OF CHINA’S MILITARY CAPABILITIES 
Since the mid-1990s, the PLA has made major advancements that have 
significantly increased China’s operational capabilities. The major domains of 
improvements have been missile systems, naval capabilities, air power, and surveillance 
capacity, along with anti-satellite and cyber capabilities. 
China’s missile systems are the fundamental elements of its warfighting 
capabilities. Their possible applications include counter-carrier and offensive counter-air 
operations. The development of extended range for missiles and their compatibility with 
different platforms, in addition to the increased precision capabilities, make these assets 
extremely valuable.41 The PLA Rocket Forces (formerly known as the Second Artillery) 
units are already equipped with more than 1,000 mobile short-range ballistic missiles 
(SRBM) that are deployed along the coastline.42 China has also increased its medium-
range ballistic missile (MRBM) forces. These missiles can be used to deliver both 
                                                 
41 Stokes, Tellis, and Tanner, “The Second Artillery Force and the Future of Long-Range Precision 
Strike,” 127–28. 
42 Andrew Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle? (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments, 2010), 17, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/2010.02.19-Why-AirSea-Battle.pdf. 
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conventional and nuclear munitions, or to conduct counter-network attacks with nuclear 
weapons’ electromagnetic pulse.43 
The Chinese Navy has made significant advancements since the early 2000s, when 
it was a still modernizing force with very limited capabilities in several warfare areas. The 
only exception was the submarine force, which, although composed mostly of old and 
conventionally rotated boats, still presented a considerable threat to adversary forces, 
mainly because of the difficulties in identifying the submarines’ locations.44 Currently, 
however, the PLA Navy has modernized, becoming a challenging force in all warfare areas. 
According to Bernard Cole, the surface combatant force has made considerable 
improvements and currently possesses anti-air warfare (AAW) destroyers and more 
capable anti-submarine warfare (ASW) vessels.45 The navy’s infrastructure has been 
improved and continues to increase in capability. The ability to administer, operate, and 
command and control tactical formations continues to improve, especially by long-range 
deployments of small flotillas.46 China has engineered a large number of stealthy patrol 
ships, capable of carrying long-range supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles. This missile-
craft fleet consists of a variety of small vessels equipped with anti-ship cruise missiles, 
indicating a different approach compared to the U.S. fleet, which consists of smaller 
numbers of ships that are usually much larger and more technologically advanced. 
China’s long-range aviation forces have also made great progress. The major 
maritime strike platform, the H-6K naval aircraft, has demonstrated a combat radius of 
1,600 nautical miles (nm) and is compatible with a wide range of missiles.47 It is capable 
of carrying up to six anti-ship cruise missiles and could be escorted with Russian-built 
land-based strike-fighters Su-30MKK2, with an extended combat radius up to 1,400 nm 
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with one refueling.48 The characteristics of these aircrafts outrange all of the manned strike 
aircraft in the U.S. Navy’s program of record’s carrier air wing.49 This suggests that in 
case of offensive operations, the U.S. carriers would have to be located within the range of 
Chinese long-range aviation, making them vulnerable from the air and undermining their 
operational effectiveness. Together, the PLA Air Force and the Naval Aviation Force are 
able to field more than ten regiments of aircraft, capable of attacking the potentially 
approaching adversary combatant ships using cruise missiles.50 Based on metrics of two 
regiments per aircraft carrier battlegroup, the PLA could potentially attack three or four 
carrier forces. Yet, it still lacks long-range, air-launched cruise missiles that could provide 
the capability to attack adversary forces from a safe distance, without crossing the 
hypothetical lines of the U.S. surface-to-air missiles range.51 
The PLA has improved targeting capabilities with increased situational awareness 
capacity, achieved through the evolution of reconnaissance satellites, space-based 
surveillance systems, onshore OTH radars, and unmanned aerial vehicles.52 Intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities are still a weakness for China. Bernard Cole 
suggests that the reason for this is a highly centralized and inflexible command and control 
structure, as well as the lack of experience of China’s Navy in net-centric warfare.53 The 
PLA tries to approach these capabilities from other angles, including submarine detection, 
helicopter OTH missions, and space-based assets.54 China continues to work on improving 
its targeting systems, including over-the-horizon backscatter (OTH-B) radars, land-based 
over-the-horizon surface wave (OTH-SW) radars, electro-optical satellites, and radar 
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satellites.55 The PLA has deployed advanced imaginary and reconnaissance satellites 
(Yaogan 1–5, Hayiang-1B, and CBERS-2), and is developing terrestrial long-wave radar 
systems focusing particularly on OTH-B high-frequency radars.56 China’s increased 
targeting capabilities threaten to expose the location of U.S. aircraft carriers that operate 
within about 1,200 nm from the Chinese coastline, making it unsafe and relatively risky 
for them to continue their presence. 
Finally, China has developed anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities and cyber 
capabilities that could be used to target adversary’s military battle networks in case of 
direct encounter. The PLA has developed both kinetic ASAT systems and ground-based 
laser ASAT weapons.57 They could be used against the U.S. Global Positioning System 
(GPS) satellites that operate in medium earth orbit. The PLA is also believed to be 
developing complex and sophisticated cyber capabilities, able to target the U.S. computer 
networks, leaving the U.S. forces without major lines of communication.58 China’s 
increased ASAT and cyber capabilities pose a threat to the U.S. military battle network and 
make its effectiveness in a potential future conflict questionable. 
B. THE RATIONALE BEHIND A2/AD CAPABILITIES 
Chinese military modernization consists of certain elements that together represent 
integrated policies aimed at forming A2/AD zones. China tries to integrate advanced 
tactical missilery, combat aviation, modern surface and subsurface combatants, and 
reconnaissance capabilities to form a barrier to potential adversaries operating within the 
region.59 China’s approach clearly involves the PLA Navy, the PLA Air Force and the 
PLA Rocket Forces (ballistic missile force), so it certainly is a joint military operation. 
Thus, China’s military advancements are far more important than just a regular 
modernization of technology on a limited scale would suggest. Current developments are 
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more interesting from the RMA standpoint, as they indicate how the PLA implements new 
ways for using the military means. China certainly considers the significant impact of RMA 
on the international political-military domains due to ongoing advancements in long-range, 
precise, smart, stealthy, and unmanned weapons and puts considerable effort into taking an 
advantageous stance.60 
China does not publicly refer to its modernization efforts as an attempt to develop 
A2/AD zones. In fact, the concept of A2/AD is rarely used by the Chinese to describe their 
military advancement. Nonetheless, the Chinese concept of shashoujian or the assassin’s 
mace, which describes the capability to overcome a far more powerful adversary, is similar 
to what Americans call A2/AD capabilities.61 At its core, the assassin’s mace reflects some 
important ideas pertinent to the A2/AD concept. “Anti-access” and “area denial” are U.S.-
coined-terms, occurring in official documents since the early 2000s and describing the 
PLA’s operational objectives. The basic idea behind this concept is to deny the U.S. aircraft 
carrier battle groups access to the Chinese shorelines in order to prevent their air wing’s 
attacks against the PLA forces.62 
From the Chinese perspective, A2/AD zones are inherently defensive formations 
since they represent a responsive operational concept. In that regard, A2/AD zones are an 
important element of China’s Active Defense concept that views counterattack capabilities 
as critical in making sure that the state possesses the capability to counter-attack in case of 
foreign aggression.63 A2/AD capabilities are designed to solve the key vulnerability that 
China had faced since the Opium Wars era: being unprotected from the coastline. 
Therefore, China wants to neutralize the possible threats it might face from the sea. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union gave China a chance to switch its strategic focus from land to 
the naval domain, as the threat of land invasion dramatically decreased. The 1996 Taiwan 
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Crisis further promoted China’s incentive to refocus from land to naval capabilities. These 
two major developments played an important role in shaping China’s contemporary 
security environment. Subsequently, the PLA has increased its attention to the naval 
domain and the naval component actually surpassed the land component in terms of 
priorities in 2004. China’s 2004 Defense White Paper noted that PLA budget priority was 
being given to the PLA Navy, the PLA Air Force, and the Second Artillery (currently the 
PLA Rocket Forces) to increase the capabilities “for winning both command of the sea and 
command of the air,” and to be able to carry out strategic counterstrikes.64 
China has developed two major layers of defense of the first and the second island 
chains, as hypothetical domains of operations. This segregation of areas makes it simpler 
to organize forces and plan future military advancements, based on the required means and 
characteristics of the systems, operating in the different areas. The first island chain 
encompasses the waters from the mainland to about 200 nm and spreads southwest from 
Japan, through the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, and Paracel Islands in the north of the South 
China Sea, while the second island chain involves the Philippine Sea and approximates 
around 1,300 nm.65 These lines form the layers that China intends to keep inaccessible to 
the American forces in the event of regional conflict. The basic logic behind having these 
layers of defense is the difficulty of dealing with naval threats. If not defeated before they 
arrive in the objective area, it becomes extremely hard to defend against the approaching 
naval forces and prevent the invasion from ashore. Therefore, it is critical to find and 
destroy the adversary’s naval capabilities in advance.  
To achieve this goal of finding and destroying the adversary forces in advance, the 
PLA has put much effort into developing missile systems, naval capabilities, air power, 
and surveillance capabilities, as previously discussed. Thus, at the end, all of these different 
domains serve the common objective to form the A2/AD zones. In order to be able to track 
the U.S. naval forces, the PLA has made major advancements in its targeting capabilities 
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as well, and it currently possesses several satellites in orbit, including radar satellite that 
can track ships as small as 20 meters in length.66 China also uses conventionally propelled 
submarines to target the U.S. Navy. Naval capabilities and especially its submarine force 
are vital to China’s A2/AD, since the force serves double purpose of finding and attacking 
the adversary forces. Today’s GPS-enabled precision targeting makes Chinese ballistic 
missiles more effective for A2/AD purposes. Furthermore, the Chinese are developing 
special tracking technologies for anti-ship ballistic missiles, traditionally an extremely hard 
task to accomplish due to ship movement.67 This capability in combination with increased 
air capabilities and the existing submarine force is said to be very hard for the United States 
to overcome in case of direct confrontation.68 
C. THE GRAY ZONE STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS 
The gray zone strategy, practiced by China, amplifies the potential implications of 
the Chinese A2/AD capabilities. The cornerstone principle of the strategy is to achieve 
limited political goals using coercive diplomacy and threats without risking escalation to 
higher levels of violence. This is usually achieved by effectively staying below the stated 
red lines. China takes advantage of the U.S. risk aversive policies and employs salami 
tactics to demonstrate regular, piece-by-piece progress.69 The major advantage of a gray 
zone strategy is its ability to prevent great power intervention by creating ambiguity and 
keeping the stakes relatively low. This strategy enhances China’s ability to obtain its goals 
through coercive diplomacy even in the unipolar system with the United States in the lead, 
creating considerable challenges to U.S. supremacy. 
China employs commercial fishing vessels and provincial maritime militia forces 
as proxies, and backs them up with maritime law enforcements and naval forces to pursue 
its territorial claims in both the South and the East China seas. Using the permanent 
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maritime presence of these forces as indirect means for pursuing territorial claims makes 
other regional powers more focused on presence competition. Yet another challenge is the 
unclear system of the command and control of such forces that makes the identification of 
the officially responsible sides extremely troublesome and time-consuming.70 This, in turn, 
lets China change the status quo through consequential steps that are calculated to remain 
below the level that would trigger the armed response. 
China’s use of the gray zone strategy is particularly important in combination with 
its increasing military capabilities that provide a significantly larger number of coercive 
means. The effectiveness of the strategy is based on the absence of clearly defined red lines 
and interests of the existing hegemon in the region in regard to certain issues and is 
reinforced by the relative decline in the military power of the hegemon. It exploits the 
ambiguity to make systematic gains at the expense of other regional powers. This, in fact, 
could be viewed as a preamble to realization of the stability-instability paradox within the 
region. The paradox suggests that as the likelihood of nuclear or full-scale conventional 
conflict declines, the risk of limited conventional confrontation increases.71 Limited 
confrontations, in turn, could be realized in the form of proxy wars, frequently practiced 
by the United States and the Soviet Union during the period of strategic stability due to the 
nuclear deterrence capabilities secured by both parties. This trend, together with the 
Chinese A2/AD capabilities, challenges American supremacy in East Asia and puts other 
regional powers under threat, thus undermining the U.S. security guarantees to the regional 
actors. This, in fact, targets both the U.S. interests and the safety of the regional states, 
which rely on American security guarantees. Hence, increased U.S. involvement and 
presence in the region is critical to deter and block the ongoing changes to the status quo 
that America and its allies have long enjoyed.  
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D. THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE AND THE COUNTERMEASURES 
From the American perspective, the PLA’s main objective is to possess the ability 
to pose a destructive threat to the U.S. naval forces operating within the second island 
chain. In practice, it means holding at risk any aircraft carrier that operates within the 
region, as well as the two key targets of Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa and Andersen 
Air Force Base in Guam. The United States has long acknowledged the challenge of the 
Chinese A2/ADs and has developed several concepts to address the issue. The most 
important of those are the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), the AirSea Battle, 
the JAM-GC, and finally the JCIC. 
The JOAC, developed back in January 2012, recognized that the U.S. interest to 
maintain power projection capability was threatened by the emerging A2/AD zones and 
proposed a cross-domain synergy as a possible solution.72 According to the concept, the 
integration of the domains would concentrate the power to make the penetration of A2/AD 
zones possible in some specific areas. This, in turn, would grant the U.S. forces the ability 
to conduct in-depth attacks without confronting the adversary through the whole perimeter. 
Overcoming China’s A2/AD would eventually restore freedom of action for the American 
Navy. 
The AirSea Battle concept, seated beneath the JOAC in the hierarchy of strategic 
documents, offered a more detailed plan on how to secure access. The key idea of 
developing “networked, integrated forces, capable of attack-in-depth to disrupt, destroy 
and defeat adversary forces” via “the application of cross-domain operations across all the 
interdependent warfighting domains (air, maritime, land, space, and cyberspace)” 
persisted.73 According to the concept, America has to offset the PLA’s military buildup by 
sustaining power projection capabilities in the region. The challenge of potential U.S. lock 
out of the region should be answered by recognizing the significance of joint operations 
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and integrating the naval, air, space, and cyber capabilities. Examples of such integration 
include: blinding PLA surveillance systems by Air Force to enable Navy operational 
freedom; assisting Air Force strikes by Navy submarine and carrier-based strikes; using 
Navy missile defense capabilities to defend the Air Force forward bases; and using the Air 
Force long-range strikes to destroy the PLA long-range missile launchers and expand 
Navy’s freedom of maneuver.74 
The AirSea Battle has recognized a set of operational problems, posed by A2/AD, 
such as the erosion of forward havens in both physical and virtual domains, the decline of 
free access to the operational areas, and the handover of initiative on both the strategic and 
operational levels. The concept sets certain conditions that should be met in order to 
mitigate these problems. These conditions/goals include the reduction of the missile threat 
to the U.S. regional bases; the enhancement of the long-range strike capabilities; the 
improvement of undersea operational capabilities; the adjustment of the vulnerabilities of 
space-based command and control; the increase in emphasis on cross-service electronic 
warfare capabilities; and advancement in cyber warfare capabilities.75 After reaching the 
conditions, the AirSea Battle campaign is supposed to successfully execute two relatively 
overlapping stages. The first stage includes withstanding the initial attack and limiting the 
damage; carrying out a blinding campaign against the adversary; running a suppression 
campaign targeting enemy’s surveillance and strike systems; and taking over the initiative. 
The second stage consists of executing a protracted campaign for exploiting the initiative, 
carrying out a distant blockade, supporting the logistics, and increasing the output of the 
industrial sector.76 
AirSea Battle played a critical role in shaping the U.S. strategy toward China’s A2/
ADs and was subsequently renamed the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the 
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Global Commons (JAM-GC) in 2015.77 Eventually, the JAM-GC has developed as an 
independent concept, but it is built on the foundation of its predecessor and remains focused 
on addressing the challenges of securing American power projection capabilities in 
response to the spread of A2/AD zones. The new concept is more politically balanced both 
for domestic and foreign audiences. On the one hand, it focuses on more integration 
between the U.S. services and is not limited to the air and sea domains only. On the other 
hand, it introduces the global commons, defined as “areas of air, sea, space, and cyberspace 
that belong to no one state,” and frames the A2/AD problem as a global challenge to the 
freedom of navigation and economic activities.78 This makes the U.S. intention to gain and 
maintain the operational access to any region more easily justifiable, as it is not viewed 
from the national interests’ perspective only, making it easier to rely on the engagement of 
the allied forces. Yet another difference between the JAM-GC and its predecessor is that 
the JAM-GC focuses on disrupting the initial intent of adversary forces rather than the A2/
AD capabilities alone, which represents an upgrade from the tactical to the operational 
level. Moreover, the JAM-GC primarily relies on the current, rather than future 
capabilities.79 
After the release of the AirSea Battle concept, many experts still considered the 
U.S. response inadequate since the developed concept only represented the tactical-
operational level and was detached from the strategy.80 Moreover, AirSea Battle relied 
heavily on hypothetical future capabilities and certain conditions, which would be difficult 
to meet, especially considering anticipated defense budget cuts. The JAM-GC is focused 
more on current capabilities, but it too is not yet an overarching strategy. Rather, it 
represents a complementary concept that aims to enhance the strategic approach that still 
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needs to be developed. Therefore, the major critique of AirSea Battle also applies to the 
JAM-GC. Consequently, neither AirSea Battle nor the JAM-GC has much to offer against 
China’s gray zone strategy. 
To address the challenge posed by gray zone strategy, the U.S. Department of 
Defense issued the JCIC on March 2018. In order to overcome the problem of operating 
below the threshold of a direct military confrontation, the document suggests shifting the 
outdated peace-war binary notion to the more relevant concept of competition, and 
coordinating the military capabilities with the aligning non-military assets of adequate 
scope across numerous domains.81 The idea is to describe the existing environment as 
competitive instead of peaceful and to promote non-military responses through inter-
organizational and multinational engagement when operating under the threshold of war. 
Nevertheless, there are significant challenges to the new approach. First, referring to the 
international environment as competitive rather than cooperative and peaceful, contradicts 
the existing insight and the values of the U.S.-led liberal world order. It promotes rivalry 
between the major powers and provokes further polarization of the East Asian region, thus 
the chances of regional states accepting the notion are poor. Moreover, the major advantage 
of the gray zone strategy is to create and exploit ambiguity on different levels to avoid 
direct responsibility. The replication of the same principles would hardly be possible for 
the democratic and transparent government. Even the employment of non-military assets 
would require the government to state its objectives clearly and to charge oneself with 
direct responsibility over the actions. Therefore, without the explicitly declared redlines 
and the political will to act on the strategic level, the JCIC would still lack the capacity to 
address the challenges caused by the gray zone strategy. 
All of the strategic documents discussed previously acknowledge the potential 
threat of the emerging A2/AD zones and gray zone strategy. It still has to be determined, 
however, whether the United States is willing to carry out much more significant steps to 
counter the threat. From the realist perspective, the ongoing changes are important, yet 
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insufficient without a significant increase in military spending, a rise in the quality or 
quantity of military deployments in the region, and the increase in number or complexity 
of the mutual exercises with the regional allies. These are the most important indicators 
that the United States should display to manifest its willingness to prevent China from 
gaining A2/AD capabilities and challenging the U.S. primacy in the region. 
There is little doubt that in the case of direct comparison the United States still 
outperforms China in key indicators of military power, namely in defense spending, 
technologically developed weapons and equipment, the quantity of aircraft carriers, the 
operational experience of the troops and the coordination among the service branches. 
Nevertheless, the geography of the hypothetical theater of war and the immense 
advancements in China’s military capabilities put an additional burden on the U.S. armed 
forces, making it ambiguous whether the existing hegemon still enjoys supremacy and 
secure power projection capabilities in the East Asian region.82 Furthermore, the global 
trends in almost all of these indicators are not in America’s favor. A little rise in defense 
spending in 2019 has further deepened the U.S. budget deficit, suggesting that future 
substantial increases are highly unlikely.83 In terms of percentages, U.S. military spending 
has been steadily decreasing for the last decade from nearly 4.6% in 2010 to 3.1% in 
2017.84 So far, hardly any clear indicators show that this trend would change in the near 
future. The slow but persistent decrease in the number of the U.S. military deployments in 
both Japan and South Korea, the two major outposts for U.S. military presence in the Asia 
Pacific Region, suggests that America is not planning to engage in a full-scale regional war 
in the near future.85 The recent withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
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viewed by many as one of the major balancing tool against China’s economic rise, has 
formed a vacuum in the architecture of Asian commerce and created a possibility for other 
powers to propose alternative deals.86 All of these developments undermine the global 
image of America’s willingness to actively balance against China; furthermore, these 
developments necessarily prompt regional states to wonder whether they should still rely 
on the security guarantees of the United States. 
To defend its interests in the Western Pacific, the United States has to restore the 
existing conventional military balance with China and demonstrate its commitments to the 
region. Therefore, America has to maintain its supreme power projection capabilities to 
back its commitments, make its security guarantees credible, and sustain regional alliances. 
In light of these objectives, internal balancing seems to be the most effective option for 
Washington. Uninterrupted U.S. military access to the region and U.S. commitment to 
defend existing allies are in question, making reliance on external balancing inefficient. 
Only by demonstrating that China’s A2/AD zones are not effective against the U.S. power 
projection capabilities can America prove that it still has the will and the power to stand 
for its allies. At the same time, it is critical for the United States to maintain a balance 
between defending its national interests and promoting an adversarial mindset on a global 
scale. If not justified from the global security perspective, American responses could be 
viewed by many states as a signal of deformation of the existing liberal world order. 
E. CONCLUSION 
U.S. involvement in the Southeast Asian region has long been based on existing 
security alliances and partnerships with states that benefited from the security guarantees 
provided by the United States. These guarantees have all been based on the U.S. military 
primacy and its ability to project power in the region, making its commitments to regional 
actors solid and credible. China’s military rise and its development of A2/AD capabilities, 
in conjunction with its gray zone strategy, pose a threat to the U.S. power projection 
capability and challenge its primacy within the region. This trend already calls into 
                                                 
86 “TPP Collapse Leaves a Worrying Void,” Economist, November 26, 2016, https://search-proquest-
com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1851052712/fulltext/FB77FE359AB94DC8PQ/1?accountid=12702. 
32 
question the U.S. capability to provide security for its allies, a problem that will likely 
worsen, making the existing alliances unreliable from the regional states’ perspective. 
Weakening of the alliances thereafter will inevitably challenge U.S. engagement in the 
region. 
The United States has developed several documents to formulate its strategy against 
the emerging threat; however, the credibility of most should still be questioned. The major 
U.S. response, known to the wider public as the AirSea Battle concept, relied on many 
conditions that had to be met in order for it to function effectively, thus making its success 
questionable. Moreover, its focus was primarily tactical-operational, making it less 
effective against China’s gray zone strategy. Is successor, the JAM-GC, remains on the 
operational level, leaving the strategic outlook still undefined. This lets Beijing achieve 
minor, yet regular gains at the expense of the regional states, by exploiting American risk 
aversion. 
The United States has not demonstrated the willingness to increase its hard power 
capabilities toward the region, sending a negative message to its regional allies and 
partners, who are highly vulnerable without U.S. security guarantees provided by the 
bilateral agreements or the American-led liberal world order. If the United States keeps its 
current stance, it might risk finding itself restricted from the region militarily, and forced 
to abandon its strategic interests of engagement in Southeast Asia. These developments can 
certainly affect the security architecture of the region and make hedging ineffective, 
suggesting that Southeast Asian states will have to shift their hedging strategies toward a 
more balancing or bandwagoning stance. The following chapter analyzes the cases of the 
Philippines and Vietnam in detail, to test the hypothesis and evaluate if and to what extent 
the shift of the strategic balance within the region has affected the strategic calculus of 
these nations and whether they still practice the hedging strategies that most Southeast 
Asian states are famous for. 
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III. CASE STUDIES 
As discussed in the previous chapter, China has made significant military 
advancements and effectively developed its A2/AD capabilities, as well as gray zone 
strategy, thus notably weakening the U.S. power projection capability within East and 
Southeast Asia. This development leads to a considerable change in the balance of power 
and even questions the long-enjoyed American primacy. The ongoing shift from 
unipolarity to a more bipolar system inevitably affects the regional security architecture. 
This thesis suggests that these changes have consequently led to a significant shift in the 
foreign policy of Southeast Asian states and make them more likely to discontinue hedging 
as a major strategy in relations with China and the United States. Such a claim is reasonable 
when considering the nature of the hedging strategy. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
According to the definition provided in the first chapter, hedging is a rational 
strategy of practicing an engagement with the existing hegemon in security matters while 
at the same time maximizing economic benefits by approaching the secondary power. More 
specifically, it implies a close economic relationship with China and a security cooperation 
with the United States. The latter consists of providing base facilities and logistics support 
or participation in mutual military exercises for the U.S. military presence in the region. At 
the very least, according to this strategy regional states would not contribute to China’s 
military rise, and thus they continue to support the long-existing status quo of American 
primacy. This definition, as do most of the other definitions by various authors discussed 
in the first chapter, implies that the system is unipolar. The key premise behind the 
successful hedging strategy for Southeast Asian countries is that states are able to avoid 
choosing sides between the great powers and to develop close relations with both sides in 
their own unique ways. If a power competition emerges between the major powers, 
however, the Southeast Asian states would be forced to choose sides; thus, they would shift 
to either a more balancing or bandwagoning stance. 
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China’s military advancements and America’s irresolute response, discussed in 
detail in the previous chapter, clearly demonstrate that the capability gap between the 
United States and China in the region shrinks considerably. Moreover, it suggests that the 
proposed shift is not only expected but almost inevitable. The only way to prevent this shift 
would be some tangible U.S. policies, driven by a strong will to counter China’s military 
rise and regain robust power projection capability, thus restoring the unipolar system and 
the status of hegemon. So far, America fails to demonstrate such a willingness and only 
scratches the surface with a few mostly ineffective initiatives. Therefore, the key 
hypothesis of the thesis suggests that some indicators of abandoning the hedging strategy 
by the Southeast Asian states should already be visible. As the power of the emerging actor 
increases and the existing hegemon declines, it would be most reasonable to expect the 
Southeast Asian states to choose appeasement as primary policy towards the emerging 
actor and to start bandwagoning with China. At the same time, these states would likely 
weaken their security cooperation with the United States gradually to avoid direct conflict 
of interests with China. In other words, since the United States fails to demonstrate capable 
security guarantees for Southeast Asian states, these states would simply be forced to seek 
a new patron. 
1. Testing the Hypothesis Using Quantitative Data 
The easiest way to test the hypothesis of this thesis would be to look at the existing 
data on the military expenditures of both the Philippines and Vietnam. Does the data 
support the hypothesis? Does the data demonstrate balancing or bandwagoning behavior 
by the Philippines or Vietnam? Could we observe the shifts from hedging to a balancing 
or bandwagoning strategy through the significant changes in the data? In order to answer 
these questions, the data on the three most widespread indicators of balancing are analyzed: 
the military spending of the Philippines and Vietnam in terms of current United States 
Dollars (USD), the same data in terms of local currencies, and the military spending of 
both nations in terms of percentage of their gross domestic product (GDP). 
The graph in Figure 1 demonstrates the Philippines’ and Vietnam’s defense 
spending from 2003 to 2017 in current USD. 
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Figure 1. The Military Expenditures of Vietnam and the Philippines 
between 2003 and 2017 (in millions of USD at current prices).87 
According to the graph, both nations have consistently increased their defense 
spending, not considering some minor lags from time to time. The general trend is clear 
and it definitely demonstrates a persistent rise in the defense budgets. It does not display 
any significant differences between some periods or others. The data suggests that both 
states have pursued balancing behavior through the whole period between 2003 and 2017, 
by consistently increasing their defense budgets.  
The next graph, shown in Figure 2 displays the same military expenditures, only 
this time in local currencies, to avoid possible misinterpretations caused by currency 
devaluations. 
                                                 




Figure 2. The Military Expenditures of Vietnam and the Philippines 
between 2003 and 2017 (in local currencies).88 
According to this graph, the broader trend remains the same. Both the Philippines 
and Vietnam have increased their military expenditures steadily, thus demonstrating 
persistent balancing behavior through the whole period between 2003 and 2017. 
The next graph, shown in Figure 3, questions this conclusion by demonstrating a 
relatively steady relationship between the GDP and the military spending of these 
countries: 




Figure 3. The Military Expenditures of Vietnam and the Philippines 
between 2003 and 2017 (in percentage of GDP).89 
According to this graph, the rise in the defense expenditures of both the Philippines 
and Vietnam has been closely related to their overall economic performance and mostly 
corresponds to the increase of national economic output in general. This graph 
demonstrates that through the same period of 2003 and 2017 both the Philippines and 
Vietnam maintained a quite steady and relatively low share of their GPD for their 
respective defense spending. The Philippines has mostly spent under 1.5% and Vietnam 
has stayed between 2% and 2.5% most of the time. This suggests that balancing behavior 
has not been pursued at all and looks like a proof for the major claim of David Kang and 
Xinru Ma, who say that the analysis of Southeast Asian states’ defense spending suggests 
that these nations do not balance against China at all.90 Yet, is it really the truth? Is this 
data enough evidence to promulgate such a claim? 
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2. The Challenge of Quantitative Data: Irrelevance of the Measurements 
Why is the major hypothesis of this thesis not supported by the quantitative data? 
Is it that the hypothesis is wrong, or perhaps the data is wrong? Most definitely, neither of 
these statements is true; both the hypothesis and the data could be correct at the same time.  
One way to explain the discrepancy between the hypothesis of this thesis and the 
quantitative data would be to argue that this type of economic indicator is less flexible and 
usually needs some time to reflect the changes in policy. Thus, there might be a need to 
wait in order to actually witness some changes. This argument might be true in general, but 
it is not necessarily relevant here. In fact, the type of quantitative data depicted in the 
preceding graphs is not relevant for the purposes of this thesis. The varying measurements 
of defense spending by countries have long been used to form a general understanding on 
states’ behavior strategies, but this data does not display the full picture and using it comes 
with its own disadvantages. The major premise while measuring the defense spending 
dynamics of nations is that their balancing or bandwagoning behavior is closely related 
with the amount of resources/money they spend on defense matters. This is quite a 
reasonable premise for most cases, but not for all. This premise does not apply when the 
power asymmetry between the monitored countries and those against whom they are 
expected to balance is extremely high. In such cases, the internal balancing as an option 
becomes irrelevant; thus, measuring domestic indicators such as defense spending can 
hardly demonstrate an accurate picture. In such cases, the balancing is mostly done 
externally, by introducing a third party into equation, which cannot be traced by monitoring 
the defense budget changes of the countries who are adopting a balancing strategy. 
To be more specific, these domestic indicators are not extremely relevant in the 
case of measuring whether the Southeast Asian states pursue a balancing or bandwagoning 
policy because of the existing imbalance between China and other regional nations. No 
matter how hard these countries try, the asymmetry of power keeps rising and it effectively 
kills the hypothetical success of these states to practice internal balancing against China. 
There is little chance for these states to pursue internal balancing successfully and their 
leaderships must have a clear understanding of that. The only tangible way for the regional 
states to balance against rising China is to appeal to another great power capable of 
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containing China. The United States is clearly the most credible candidate for the job. 
Therefore, the most important indicator to measure whether these states pursue balancing 
or bandwagoning policies is to analyze their relationship dynamics with the United States 
and China, the strategy that this thesis elaborates in the following case studies. 
In order to test the hypothesis, the following sections are dedicated to the analysis 
of two independent cases of Southeast Asian states: the Philippines and Vietnam. These 
countries differ greatly, spanning a wide range of variables and making the generalization 
of the conclusions more robust. The Philippines, an island country representative of 
maritime Southeast Asia, appears an obvious example of the U.S. ally in the region, whose 
security is highly dependent on American power projection capabilities, especially in the 
naval domain. Vietnam, on the other hand, representative of mainland Southeast Asia, does 
not have a direct defense treaty with the United States. It is more self-sufficient in security 
regard. Nevertheless, the naval domain is critical for Vietnam’s security as well, suggesting 
that any significant decline in America’s long-enjoyed freedom of navigation in the region 
would definitely affect Vietnam’s security environment. 
The case studies focus on the occurring or expected changes in the existing defense 
treaties or other formal relations; the number and the magnitude of military bases or facility 
sharing agreements; the scale of joint military exercises; or changes in the military 
spending for each case. These indicators could potentially demonstrate the trend of 
weakening security ties with the United States or increasing security cooperation with 
China. Both of these tendencies would contradict the definition of hedging and would 
suggest that the anticipated shift is already taking place. 
B. THE PHILIPPINES 
The Philippines effectively started its hedging policy after the end of the Cold War 
in the early 1990s. The Ramos Administration made some significant efforts to engage in 
and build close economic relations with China despite some emerging territorial disputes 
during the 1990s. The Sino-Philippines relations were further strengthened during the 
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2000s and eventually culminated under President Gloria Arroyo.91 The Philippines’ 
foreign policy during this period best fits the definition of hedging since Manila maintained 
its status of key U.S. ally in the region in the security realm, while at the same time it 
developed close economic cooperation with China in many regards. The Philippines 
enjoyed a hedging policy until the late 2000s and early 2010s, when it gradually shifted to 
balancing against and later to bandwagoning with China under the Duterte Administration. 
To understand the causal factors and the rationale behind these shifts it is vital to analyze 
these periods separately in more detail. The following sections discuss the Philippines’ 
historical experience with hedging, the first shift toward balancing, and the following 
reorientation toward a bandwagoning stance; and demonstrate how China’s military 
advancements influenced the Philippines’ foreign policy choices. 
1. Historical Experience: Hedging as Historical Norm 
The Philippines mostly developed its hedging policies after the end of the Cold 
War, as it was closely engaged with the United States in defense cooperation, and the end 
of bipolar conflict made it possible for Manila to pursue more independent economic 
policies and engage other powers in terms of economic ties. In the early 1990s, there were 
some alterations, namely the discussions in the Philippines on diminishing American 
influence. In fact, the Philippine-American Cooperation Treaty (PACT) was ended in 1991, 
along with the permanent American military presence after the closure of the two major 
U.S. military bases of Subic and Clark in the Philippines’ territory.92 It is important to 
underline, however, that these developments were a response to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the vanishing existential threat, and were mainly orchestrated by Washington, 
rather than Manila. Thus, they have nothing to do with the Philippines already 
bandwagoning with China or any other power by downgrading its military ties with the 
United States. These alterations were soon revised after reaching the Visiting Forces 
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Agreement (VFA) in 1998. The new agreement provided the U.S. military with the right 
to restore its posture and fill the security vacuum it created after withdrawing its forces 
from the region. This agreement played a significant role in reinforcing the U.S.-Philippine 
security cooperation including conducting large-scale military exercises and strengthening 
intelligence sharing.93 Moreover, it effectively created a background for the Philippines to 
develop its hedging policies.  
The Philippines further cultivated its hedging approach during the 2000s. This 
period became an explicit example of practicing hedging. The Philippines demonstrated its 
interest in gaining a profit from China’s economic advancements, but at the same time, it 
did not want to sacrifice its security ties with the United States. The Arroyo Administration 
put a major emphasis on engaging China both politically and economically. During this 
period, the Philippines signed the largest number of bilateral agreements with China in its 
history and promoted significant economic projects like the ones with Zhongxing 
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) or North Railway initiative.94 Furthermore, 
Manila developed the Joint Maritime Seismic Understanding (JMSU) during 2005–2008 
and refused to join other Southeast Asian states in criticizing Beijing based on the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); the Philippines even protested 
against Vietnam and Malaysia for submitting their claims to the continental shelf in the 
waters of the South China Sea.95 During this period, the Philippines developed economic 
cooperation with China, while at the same time secured its defense ties with the United 
States.96 This reflected essential elements of the hedging strategy: being able to maintain 
its security cooperation with the existing American hegemon, while at the same time 
deepening economic cooperation with emerging China. The situation dramatically changed 
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since the late 2000s, when China’s military advancements and coercive diplomacy were 
already affecting the foreign policy calculus of other regional states.97 
2. End of Hedging: Beginning of Balancing 
In the early 2000s, when China’s military rise was only beginning to gather its 
momentum, the Philippines enjoyed considerably different relations with China from those 
it had to face in the late 2000s and beyond. According to Renato Cruz De Castro, the 
Philippines’ arrest of Chinese anglers within the waters near the Scarborough Shoal in the 
early 2000s resulted in a formal apology by the Chinese ambassador to the Philippines, 
rather than any aggressive behavior from Beijing.98 Based on this example, De Castro 
demonstrates that China did not actively question the jurisdiction of Manila back then, but 
the situation drastically changed within a few years. Following the long phase of peaceful 
economic rise, China developed a more aggressive foreign policy since the late 2000s, 
when its military advancements were ultimately taking place.99  
In 2009, China reintroduced its nine-dash line and put forward its claims over the 
water and land within the South China Sea in 2009. This substantially changed its views 
of and behavior in the region. The next arrest of Chinese fishermen by Philippine officials 
resulted intervention by China’s military vessels and eventually ended up as a Scarborough 
Shoal standoff in 2012. Furthermore, in 2013 Beijing began massive construction on the 
disputed territories. Several artificial features/islands were built, which the PLA exploited 
by deploying their facilities on them. Chinese military bases evolved near the disputed 
Mischief Reef and the Second Thomas Shoal within the Spratly Islands.100 The rising 
military capabilities and formation of A2/AD zones provided China with more freedom of 
action in the South China Sea, since it ultimately restricted U.S. power projection 
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capabilities and thus undermined American pressure and constraints over China’s 
aggressive behavior.  
The Philippines initially responded by altering its hedging strategy and focusing 
more on balancing actions. As a result of China’s military rise and accompanying growing 
territorial claims, the Aquino Administration developed an “Anything-But-Arroyo” 
campaign and put an emphasis on active balancing instead of engagement and hedging. 
This policy was ultimately based on the premise of American support along the way.101 
With the hope of U.S. backing, the Philippines promoted clear anti-Chinese policies. 
Manila initiated an arbitration against China at an arbitral tribunal under Article 287 and 
Annex VII of UNCLOS at The Hague and effectively won the case by 2016, suggesting 
that most of China’s claims in the South China Sea, including the Spratly disputes, were 
illegitimate.102 
Furthermore, the Philippines made considerable efforts to reshape its armed forces 
and change the initial focus on domestic security, putting more emphasis on territorial 
defense.103 The Philippines initiated defense modernization programs to overcome critical 
challenges in terms of its military capabilities. The Aquino Administration allocated nearly 
$400 million to modernization programs, almost eight times more than the average for the 
last 15 years.104 Furthermore, procurements increased to $1.8 billion and the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Long-Term Capability Development Plan was elaborated, 
aiming to significantly increase the Philippine Navy’s capabilities by acquiring multi-role 
attack vessels, off-shore patrol craft, and both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air 
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missiles.105 Apart from that, the Philippines also increased its surveillance capabilities by 
obtaining patrol planes with surveillance radar and P-3C Orion reconnaissance planes.106 
Moreover, Manila attempted to strengthen its military ties with Washington by 
signing the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) in 2014. This executive 
agreement updated and enhanced the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and granted the United 
States the right to deploy its military forces on the Philippines’ territory on rotational 
bases.107 The EDCA provided American military access to the Philippines’ bases of 
Lumbia Air Base; Antonio Bautista Air Base; Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base; Base Air 
Base and Fort Magsaysay.108 This provided a strong signal that the United States would 
regain a significant military presence in the Philippines.  
Nevertheless, this policy was soon changed due to the U.S. failure to demonstrate 
the willingness to catch up with the ongoing changes in the regional security environment 
and focus on risk averse policies. Despite the anticipated American renewed attention to 
the broader East Asian region and the Philippines’ hope for transforming the Sino-
Philippines bilateral collision into triangular relationship,109 the United States failed to 
take a more active role. America aimed to defuse potential escalations in any regional 
conflict, thus promoting some concerns over its willingness to back up its commitments to 
its allies.110 American support for peaceful resolution of conflicts aimed to restrict China 
from using its military superiority over smaller neighbors, but on the other hand, it was 
also a signal for the Philippines that the United States was cautious about becoming 
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entangled in a direct confrontation with China over Filipino matters. Therefore, naturally, 
the Philippines followed Thucydides’ famous teachingthe strong do what they can and 
the weak suffer what they mustand reoriented its foreign policy 180 degrees toward a 
more bandwagoning stance. 
3. How and Why the Philippines Ended Up with Bandwagoning 
Since 2016, the Philippines has demonstrated a sharp reorientation of its foreign 
policy from being U.S.-focused to becoming more China-focused. China’s immense 
military advancements and increasingly coercive foreign policy, along with America’s 
failure to provide credible security guarantees has pushed the Philippines to pick 
bandwagoning as a major strategy for its foreign policy calculus. Manila, on the one hand, 
has deepened its cooperation with China, including engagement in security matters; while 
on the other hand, it has downgraded its defense cooperation with the United States. By 
doing so, the Philippines has clearly demonstrated that it is far from the classical 
understanding of hedging and is on a finely defined path of bandwagoning with China.  
a. Enhanced Security Cooperation with China 
One of the first turnovers in the Philippine foreign policy was the decision to refuse 
the use of the victory gained at the UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal to mobilize the international 
community and try to force China to follow the key elements of the arbitration. Instead of 
approaching the United States “to enforce key elements of the ruling” or using the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to promote multilateral leverage over 
China’s activities within the South China Sea, the Duterte Administration has put an 
emphasis on “direct bilateral negotiations with China” and declared that Manila was not 
interested in raising the possibility of arbitration.111 The reasoning behind this decision 
was actually rather straightforward. Beijing had long pressured Manila to reject a 
multilateral approach and legal attempts to solve the territorial disputes. During this period, 
China mobilized a growing number of military vessels and highlighted that it would not 
                                                 
111 Heydarian, “Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte and the Shifting Sands of Philippine 
Foreign Policy,” 229. 
46 
accept American intervention in the dispute; meanwhile the United States continued not to 
take sides and followed the peaceful resolution directive.112 Beijing’s successful 
experience with unilaterally imposing the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the 
East China Sea and being able to make it function despite American and Japanese 
objections, demonstrated further possible threats for the Philippines: by following the same 
pattern and introducing a new ADIZ within the South China Sea, China could hinder the 
Philippines’ supply lines.113 Consequently, the Duterte Administration raised reasonable 
concerns about the reliability of American security guarantees and made a rational choice 
to bandwagon with China. As a result, the Philippines arrived at a joint oil and gas 
exploration proposal with China within the disputed waters in the South China Sea.114 
The Duterte Administration has also taken important steps toward deepening the 
Sino-Philippine security cooperation. This relation is still in an embryonic state, though it 
shows a potential to expand in the near future. Manila has granted Chinese ships access to 
the Philippine shoal, a sort of freedom of navigation, on the condition that they would not 
aggressively interfere with the Filipino Coast Guard.115 Moreover, the Philippines 
declared its interest in acquiring Chinese-made weapons for its military. The first deal 
amounted to around $14 million worth of small arms and patrol boats; China also offered 
to the Philippines a loan of $500 million to let it purchase more Chinese military 
equipment.116 
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b. Downgraded Defense Cooperation with the United States 
In addition to some efforts at deepening the security cooperation with China, the 
Philippines has demonstrated even more serious indicators of abandoning the hedging and 
balancing strategies by distancing itself from its major ally – the United States. Since 2016, 
Manila has effectively downgraded its military ties with Washington. The Philippines 
suspended joint patrols and key military drills with American forces in the South China 
Sea. The Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training Exercise (CARAT) and the joint 
U.S.-Philippine Amphibious Landing Exercise (PHIBLEX) have both been canceled since 
late 2016.117 Moreover, the bilateral military exercises, perceived to be directed against 
China, were modified so that they became focused on humanitarian assistance and risk 
reduction, anti-terrorism, and anti-narcotics operations, rather than a territorial defense.118 
Furthermore, the Duterte Administration banned the United States from building a weapon 
depot on the Philippine territory and, even more importantly, banned America from 
launching its Freedom of Navigation operations from the Philippines territories.119  
The Philippines and the United States have retained a fair number of joint military 
exercises so far; however, the number of war games has been reduced by nearly halved. In 
addition, Manila has asked the U.S. Special Operations Forces to leave Mindanao and 
canceled the procurement of 26,000 American-made assault rifles for the Philippine 
National Police (PNP), while at the same time initiating a discussion on modifying the 
EDCA with a clear aim of downgrading it.120 Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana even 
declared that Manila was planning to review the Mutual Defense Treaty (MTD), based on 
the fact that, “it’s been a long time” since its approval and there is a need to find out whether 
it is “still valid or still relevant today,” to decide whether “to maintain it, strengthen it, or 
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scrap it.” Additionally, Lorenzana mentioned that National Defense Act of 1935 should be 
reviewed.121 If successful, this process should be considered one of the strongest indicators 
for the breakup of U.S.-Philippine relations, as these documents represent the core 
foundation for the security architecture of the Philippines that for decades has been based 
on the security alliance with the Unites States. 
c. Why Bandwagoning Instead of Balancing?  
China’s military rise and coercive foreign activities have pushed Manila to abandon 
its hedging policy and come up with a more effective alternative. The emergence of China 
as a military power promoted the security competition within the region and polarized the 
environment, which have made hedging strategies less applicable. Since the late 2000s, the 
Philippines has abandoned hedging. Initially, however, Manila decided in favor of 
balancing. This seemed a rational option, based on the assumption that the United States 
would be willing to contain China’s military advancements and retain its global power 
projection capabilities, effectively securing the interests of its regional allies through 
broader East Asia. The lack of will from the American side to engage in more direct 
confrontation with China and the U.S. decision to focus more on risk averse policies made 
balancing by the Philippines irrational. Without the strong support of American military 
presence, the relatively obsolete force of the Philippines is in no way able to face the 
Chinese capabilities. The only way for Manila to balance against Beijing is by promoting 
an external balancing approach that relies on U.S. support. After the tremendous progress 
made by China’s military, the U.S. decision makers became more reluctant to draw clearly 
defined red lines and to commit to enforcing them.  
Confident of its growing power, China has promulgated its territorial claims by 
augmenting its military posture and applying a coercive diplomacy toward others.122 At 
the same time, American officials have kept talking about Sino-U.S. relations as “the most 
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important bilateral relationship of the 21st century.”123 Therefore, America has clearly 
focused on accommodating China and that has contributed to the U.S. failure to prevent 
Beijing from building massive artificial islands within the South China Sea. The 
militarization of those islands has given China the ability to control the South China Sea 
“in all scenarios short of war with the United States.”124 The Obama Administration chose 
not to make China withdraw from Scarborough Shoal after the 2012 agreement. The 
Philippines has fulfilled its part of the agreement, and hence, has lost the access to the 
territory that it previously fished in alongside Chinese fishermen.125 These failures of its 
long-standing ally suggested to the Philippines that it was time to change sides and 
accommodate China without explicit U.S. security guarantees. 
The Philippines’ shift was based on the judgment that America would not help it in 
the event of a direct confrontation with China, and was apparently a result of China’s 
military rise and creation of A2/AD capabilities. This signaled to the regional powers that 
they had to coexist with an emerging regional actor; it was time to make decisions on 
choosing sides, and actually look for a new patron. It is interesting that the Philippines 
under Duterte’s bandwagoning approach has still continued the defense modernization 
programs initiated by Aquino during his balancing policy. Manila has increased its defense 
budget by 15% in 2018 and has declared its intentions to continue acquiring the military 
equipment, including conventional submarines.126 On the other hand, however, the 
Philippines clearly prefers China and Russia over other suppliers like the United States or 
its allies, thus making sure to pass the message that Manila is not intending to balance 
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against China.127 Moreover, the ever-growing capability gap between the Philippines and 
China clearly suggests that focusing on internal balancing alone would be a meaningless 
effort by the Duterte Administration. Internal balancing takes a tremendous amount of 
resources and capabilities. It is harder to hold the balancing posture, especially if one does 
not have a stronger ally. Hence, downsizing the military cooperation with United States 
ultimately puts Manila on the bandwagoning path with China. Without powerful external 
allies, small powers are usually destined to bandwagon, because of the lack of the resources 
to actually balance against the rising great powers.128 The Philippines case once again 
demonstrates the truth of this postulate. Duterte’s statements on the nature of the 
Philippines’ foreign policy further reaffirm this logic. He has openly declared that he would 
never go to war against China and would not risk the lives of Filipino soldiers simply 
because winning would be impossible, thus making the choice irrational.129  
d. Counterargument - The Duterte Factor  
The Duterte factor is essentially one of the most important counterarguments that 
can be applied to the key hypothesis of this thesis. Some might argue that the ongoing 
changes in the Philippine foreign policy are nothing more than a reflection of a particular 
leader’s views. According to this claim, Manila’s shift towards bandwagoning with China 
is a personal preference of President Rodrigo Duterte and would change as soon as he 
leaves office. Duterte is indeed the first president to call for downgrading the U.S. alliance 
and deepening security ties with China at the same time.130 Nevertheless, is he the only 
one to push the Philippines to abandon hedging strategies? The previous sections clearly 
demonstrate that the Philippines’ shift from hedging did not start when Duterte acquired 
power in 2016. On the contrary, it has much deeper roots and was initiated in the early 
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2010s under President Benigno Aquino.131 Aquino’s shift from a hedging to a balancing 
policy was a response to China’s already growing military capabilities and coercive policy, 
and had less to do with his personal preferences, as in case of Duterte’s anti-American 
policies. The fact that Duterte has long been known as an anti-American politician does 
not undermine the structural realist argument. In fact, it even strengthens its logic by 
highlighting that Duterte secured a decisive victory over multiple well-funded mainstream 
candidates, while the public was well aware of his anti-American sentiments.132 This 
suggests that Duterte was hardly the only Filipino who thought about abolishing ties with 
the United States and bandwagoning with China instead. Perhaps the domestic opinion was 
already mobilized around the need to bandwagon with China due to its growing military 
capabilities and America’s relative decline in promoting security guarantees accordingly. 
Anyway, both Aquino and Duterte were acting to respond the changing international 
environment, which was mainly caused by China’s military rise and the U.S. unwillingness 
to restore the previous balance of power and maintain the credibility of the U.S. 
commitments to its allies. All of these actually demonstrate that even before Duterte there 
were some shifts from hedging toward more of a balancing or bandwagoning approach. It 
is important to realize that even though Duterte has changed foreign policy 180 degrees, 
he has merely continued what was started before him as a result of China’s growth and the 
rising great power competition in the region. The reason why the Philippines chose 
balancing but later ended up taking the bandwagoning stance is actually quite simple. 
Manila had hoped for U.S. support, but it soon perceived that America was not willing to 
escalate relationship with China to direct military confrontation for the Philippines, so it 
chose the option that was more pragmatic. 
4. Conclusion 
The detailed analysis of the Philippines’ foreign policy strategy through the last 
decades demonstrated that Manila indeed started with hedging as a key strategy for its 
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foreign decision-making calculus. Nevertheless, after the significant changes in the 
security environment, namely China’s tremendous military advancements and growing 
coercive behavior, the Philippines was forced to abandon hedging policies and to choose 
sides with the emerging power, rather than the existing hegemon. The old formula of 
security ties with the United States along with economic engagement with China was no 
longer applicable. The Philippines, as a U.S. ally, envisioned American support as a given, 
which contributed to a shift toward balancing behavior in the beginning. Soon, however, it 
became clear for Manila that Washington was rather ambivalent about backing up its 
commitments to its allies due to China’s A2/AD capabilities and increased risks in the 
event of direct confrontation. This resulted a dramatic change in the Philippine foreign 
calculus and the Duterte Administration has adopted bandwagoning policies directed at 
engaging China in terms of both economy and security, while at the same time 
downgrading the defense cooperation with the United States. 
C. VIETNAM 
Vietnam has effectively practiced hedging policies since the normalization of its 
relations with major great powers in the 1990s. Vietnam, as well as the Philippines, has 
focused on strengthening economic relations with China through the 1990s and the 2000s, 
while at the same time making some efforts to develop its strategic options by 
multidirectional foreign policy, one of the key aspects of which was forming the security 
cooperation with the United States. By the end of the 2000s and early 2010s, China’s 
military advancements started to affect the regional security environment, forcing Vietnam 
to abandon its hedging stance and shift to a balancing policy. The shift was fortified by the 
expectation that the United States would take the lead in containing China throughout the 
South China Sea. The subsequent deviation in the U.S. commitments toward the region, 
however, made Vietnam pull back and reorient its foreign policy toward a more 
bandwagoning posture. To unpack in more detail the rationale behind these 
transformations, the following section analyzes these periods separately: starting from 
Vietnam’s historical experience with hedging, moving to its shift to balancing, and finally 
addressing Vietnam’s reorientation toward bandwagoning policies. 
53 
1. Historical Experience: Hedging as Historical Norm 
Vietnam’s historical experience was very different from that of the Philippines. 
While the Philippines enjoyed the status of major U.S. ally in the region for several 
decades, Vietnam’s relations with the United States have changed dramatically, from being 
an adversary to becoming a partner. Vietnam’s relations with China have not been linear 
either. Initially acting as a big brother and a good comrade, China became a major enemy 
during the Third Indochina War, and ended up as a significant partner afterwards. 
Vietnam’s security environment has also drastically changed since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The country found itself isolated without major allies among the great 
powers. To address this challenge Vietnam developed a pro-active multidirectional foreign 
policy and diversified its relations with other nations.133 This approach was further 
strengthened by Doi Moi, the economic renovation policy started in the mid-1980s, which 
implied the shift from a planned to market-oriented economy. The historical experience of 
non-linear and complex relationships with other powers pushed Vietnam to cultivate the 
formula of cooperation and struggle, meaning that with any particular state Vietnam could 
have points of cooperation and points of struggle simultaneously.134 In terms of foreign 
policy, this approach was translated into developing close economic ties with China, while 
at the same time expanding security cooperation with other major powers, including the 
United States.135 This, in terms used in this thesis, is essentially a codification of a hedging 
strategy. Thus, after the normalization of its relations with major great powers in the early 
1990s, Vietnam effectively started to practice hedging policies.  
The approach of leaving the space for controversies with friends and for 
cooperation with adversaries was maintained through the 2000s as well.136 During this 
period, Vietnam’s foreign policy was best described as hedging. On the one hand, Hanoi 
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was putting major emphasis on enhancing economic cooperation with China while on the 
other hand, it initiated closer security cooperation with the United States, especially since 
2003.137 In due course, Hanoi signed the treaty on Delimitation of the Territorial Sea, the 
Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf in the Gulf of Tonkin with China, and 
simultaneously announced its readiness to receive U.S. supply vessels at Cam Ranh 
Bay.138 During the same period, Vietnam-Chinese relations were gaining momentum in 
both the political and economic domains.139 The situation has changed since the late 2000s, 
after China’s military advancements became an indisputable threat to the regional balance 
of power and brought the existing status quo into question, making the hedging strategy 
irrelevant and even troublesome. 
2. End of Hedging: Beginning of Balancing 
China’s military rise facilitated Beijing’s expansionist attitudes and aggressive 
foreign policy, evolved since the late 2000s. This development challenged the interests of 
several Southeast Asian countries. Vietnam occupies more islands in the disputed 
territories than any other Southeast Asian nation; therefore, it was inherently more sensitive 
to any provocations than others might have been.140 As a response to China’s rise and the 
threat it posed to the existing status quo, Vietnam shifted from the hedging described 
previously to more of a balancing policy. Although Vietnam’s shift was not as clear-cut as 
that of the Philippines’, much evidence of this shift was manifested in terms of Hanoi’s 
increasing focus on military modernization, deepening its security relations with the United 
States, and undermining the one-sided view of China as an economic powerhouse. 
China’s military advancements and its increasing military posture in the South 
China Sea were key drivers in Vietnam’s changing perceptions about its neighbor. China 
clearly transformed from being the source of economic opportunities for Vietnam to being 
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the source of threat and aggression. If during the 1990s and early 2000s China was mainly 
associated with long-term economic benefits, after the 2010s, it demonstrated itself as a 
revisionist actor with expansionist intentions.141 Subsequently, Hanoi started to openly 
identify China as a threat.142 This radical change in perceptions negatively affected the 
close economic partnership of the two states. Vietnam started to prioritize security risks 
over economic benefits while making decisions about further economic enhancements with 
China. One example of this trend was the rejection of the Chinese offer to construct a high-
speed railway connecting Phnom Penh and Ho Chi Minh City, based on security concerns 
of many Vietnamese, in view of the fact that China could later use the railway to deploy 
troops easily in the event of an attack against Vietnam.143 Moreover, Vietnam started to 
favor economic cooperation with states other than China.144 At the same time, Vietnam 
began to diversify its options, establishing strategic partnerships with 16 countries and 
comprehensive partnerships with ten other states.145 Vietnam has put an emphasis on 
internationalization of the disputes within the South China Sea and balancing China’s 
rising influence with the help of other great powers.146 While doing so, Vietnam has 
primarily focused on fortifying its relations with five major powers: the United States, 
China, Russia, Japan and India.147 
Vietnam’s multi-directional foreign policy gave it an ability to diversify its relations 
globally and helped greatly when the country focused on military modernization. Even 
though Russia has long been its major supplier of military equipment and technology, 
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Vietnam has managed to make procurements from several other countries too, such as the 
United States, Ukraine, Belarus, Romania, France, Spain, Canada, and others.148 It is 
important to highlight that these procurements were far from being typical replacements of 
outdated systems and envisaged the more far-reaching goal of a new capacity building for 
the Vietnamese armed forces.149 In 2010, Vietnam acquired six diesel-electric Kilo-class 
submarines from Russia.150 It also made a deal to acquire DHC-6 Twin Otter Series 400 
aircraft from Canada and obtained helicopters and army transport aircraft from France.151 
With the emphasis on creating retaliatory capabilities through advanced weapon systems, 
Vietnam obtained 36 Sukhoi Su-30MK2 multirole aircraft, shore-based anti-ship cruise 
missiles, and surface-to-air missile batteries.152 As a result of these procurements, Vietnam 
was the eighth largest importer of arms worldwide from 2011 to 2015.153 At the end, 
Vietnam also “greatly expanded its cost guard presence, fielding a force larger than those 
of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia combined.”154 Nevertheless, due to the 
asymmetry between Vietnam and China, Hanoi’s efforts directed at internal balancing 
could hardly be considered a success without external support.  
In addition to military modernization programs, Vietnam has also put an emphasis 
on deepening security cooperation with the United States, the only candidate capable of 
containing China in the South China Sea.155 It was clear for Vietnam that American 
military presence in the region was the only effective tool against China’s military rise and 
its revisionist intentions in the sea domain, which are reaffirmed by viewing the United 
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States as the greatest ally and China as the greatest threat by the majority of Vietnamese.156 
Therefore, Vietnam made significant efforts to ally itself with the United States against 
China since the late 2000s and began to move “from token gestures” to “substantive 
ties.”157 Consequently, Hanoi and Washington have focused on strengthening defense 
cooperation. In 2008, Vietnam and the United States established an annual strategic and 
security dialogue.158 In the following year, Washington included Vietnam in foreign 
military financing (FMF) for the first time.159 Soon, Vietnam started to host U.S. military 
vessels such as the destroyer USS John S. McCain and the aircraft carrier USS George 
Washington, sending an important signal on Hanoi’s willingness to intensify the military 
cooperation.160 The parties also established a bilateral Defense Policy Dialogue in 
2010,161 followed by technical joint naval exercises in the South China Sea in 2011.162 
The Pivot to Asia policy by the Obama Administration was viewed by Vietnam as a 
confirmation of America’s long-term commitment and encouraged further enhancement of 
its partnership with the United States, such as upgrading the relations to Comprehensive 
Partnership status in 2013.163 Hanoi welcomed U.S. support for peaceful resolution of 
conflicts in the South China Sea based on international law and avoidance of the use of 
force, since from the Vietnam’s perspective it was directed to restrict China’s leverage and 
undermine its claims.164 In addition to strengthening defense cooperation with the United 
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States, Vietnam also focused on intensifying economic ties and joined the U.S.-led TPP.165 
The TPP was one of the key pillars of America’s Asian Pivot policy, perceived by many 
as an economic containment initiative against China. By joining the TPP, Vietnam made 
an important step toward not only diversifying its economy and avoiding dependence on 
China, but also demonstrating its readiness to take part in economic containment and 
balancing against China. 
3. How and Why Vietnam Ended up with Bandwagoning 
Vietnam faces a high threat from China and has mainly negative expectations, 
making it a perfect candidate for maintaining balancing policies.166 Therefore, naturally 
the Philippines’ sharp reorientation since the 2016 from balancing against to bandwagoning 
with China has provided some with hope that Vietnam would take the lead in challenging 
the territorial claims of Beijing and becoming the key regional state balancing against 
China.167 Despite these expectations, though, Vietnam’s anti-Chinese sentiments 
weakened around the same period as the Philippines made its similar shift, as Shaofeng 
Chen puts it: Hanoi was “more inclined to weave closer ties with Washington and take a 
strong position towards China” before 2016.168 Again, the shift in Vietnam’s policies was 
not as sharp as the Philippines’ reorientation. Nevertheless, a fair amount of evidence 
supporting this point has become available and scholars have begun to point to Vietnam’s 
lack of balancing in recent years, wondering why China’s capacity and intent to pursue 
revisionist goals has not provoked additional balancing behavior from Hanoi.169 Some 
have even argued that Vietnam has never actually balanced against China due to its worries 
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about being entrapped in a great power competition and has exclusively practiced hedging 
policies by diversifying its strategic partnerships with other powers at the times when the 
U.S.-Vietnamese defense relations progressed remarkably.170 These authors assess the 
current arrangement properly indeed; however, their judgment on the absence of balancing 
whatsoever in Vietnam’s foreign policy is misleading. The analysis of Vietnam’s policies 
during the late 2000s and the early 2010s, as shown previously, clearly displays the 
limitations of these views and demonstrates Vietnam’s shift from hedging to balancing 
behavior during this period. The question then becomes, how and why did Vietnam end up 
with a more bandwagoning stance anyway?  
The following section illuminates constraints on Vietnam’s balancing and 
elucidates the shift to bandwagoning by focusing on Vietnam’s efforts to soften its 
approach to China, the inadequacy of its internal balancing, and most importantly, the 
deficiencies in its external balancing. Vietnam has started to demonstrate its commitments 
to balance against China’s military rise and its revisionist behavior since the late 2000s. 
These commitments were demonstrated by taking a hard-line approach to China, focusing 
on modernization of its own armed forces, and mainly, on emphasizing the deepening of 
the defense and security cooperation with the United States. These pillars, however, faded 
away as the United States failed to demonstrate its willingness to catch up with the growing 
Chinese military presence in the South China Sea and secure its ability to project power 
throughout the region without much struggle. This signaled to Vietnam that balancing 
against China was too risky in the absence of strong American commitment, while China’s 
military rise has restricted its ability to hedge effectively between the two. Thus, Vietnam 
reoriented to bandwagoning with China.  
a. Softening the Policies toward China 
The first signs of Vietnam’s evolving bandwagoning policies were demonstrated 
by softening its approach to China. Instead of maintaining its newly growing image of hard 
liner, Vietnam made its way to accommodate China by considering Beijing’s interests 
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during its own foreign decision-making process, supporting Chinese until-now-ominous 
economic propositions, and making efforts to reassure China due to the high risk of 
potential escalation, the cost of which would be exorbitant after China’s military 
advancements. 
In 2014, China deployed its oil rig Hai Yang Shi You 981 (HD 981) within the 
Vietnamese claimed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Vietnam placed its maritime law 
enforcement ships to defend its sovereignty and national interests; however, at the same 
time it deployed a special envoy to China in order to avoid deterioration of relations and 
provocation of escalation.171 China, in turn, placed more than a hundred vessels within the 
adjacent waters, aggressively interfering and using water cannons against the Vietnamese 
ships.172 At the same time, Beijing ‘failed’ to communicate with Hanoi through the 
emergency hotline, primarily designed for such circumstances.173 The crisis continued for 
several weeks, but Vietnam could not decide to escalate counter-coercion because of the 
lack of formal alliances, among other reasons.174 Vietnam neglected the option of turning 
to the United States for support or emphasizing international legal action.175 It only 
partially attempted to internationalize the incident.176 Vietnam was still struggling to make 
a hard decision when China declared that its mission was over and it was withdrawing its 
forces.177 This crisis displayed the first signs of Vietnam’s diminishing determination to 
practice a hard posture against China and demonstrated that Hanoi considered the 
accommodating policies in the absence of strong foreign assistance. This was a 
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considerable signal that without a major ally, Vietnam would rather practice appeasement 
than balancing in the case of a direct confrontation threat from China. 
The relaxation of confrontational policies was followed by significant changes in 
the Vietnamese perceptions and priorities in regard to China’s economic propositions. If 
during balancing Hanoi put major emphasis on security issues, after the shift, it clearly 
prioritized the economic benefits. For instance, shortly after the oil rig incident, Hanoi 
joined Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), proposed by China and viewed by 
some as a potential balancer to existing U.S.-led financial institutions.178 Vietnam also 
changed its position on the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI), developed by China in 
2013 as a maritime complement for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Focused on the 
security challenges, Vietnam initially worried about the potential political costs of MSRI 
in regard to the status of the disputed territories within the South China Sea and pursued a 
healthy skepticism; however, this approach changed after the 2016.179 At this period, 
Vietnam “found itself engaged” in the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative.180 
Moreover, Vietnam recently announced its intention to open three special economic zones 
and lease the land to foreign investors for up to 99 years, with China being viewed by many 
as the most prominent candidate for the offer.181 Furthermore, Vietnam has agreed to work 
with China to construct highways and high-speed railways, projects increasing cross-
border connectivity, despite turning down similar propositions previously due to security 
concerns.182 Beijing truly rewards those with conformist behavior towards its military rise 
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and growing territorial claims. After softening its approach towards Beijing, Hanoi also 
received an appropriate donation: China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) into Vietnam 
more than doubled in 2016.183 Even if done ostensibly for economic benefits, Vietnam’s 
formation of bonds with its greater neighbor should definitely be considered a 
“bandwagoning with security implications.”184 
Yet another sign of the fading of its balancing behavior has been Vietnam’s 
growing emphasis on considering Chinese interests in Hanoi’s foreign decision-making 
calculus. An increasing number of current articles on the matter focus on Vietnam’s 
attempt to reassure China during the development of bilateral cooperation with other 
nations, especially when those partners appear to be rivals of the China.185 Clearly, 
Vietnam-U.S. relations are no exception. Therefore, Hanoi has made significant efforts to 
reassure Beijing that its partnership with the United States is not directed against “any third 
state,” namely China.186 Hanoi needs to appreciate Beijing’s interests and positions about 
its own foreign policy decisions.187 In 2017, Vietnam even suspended a gas-drilling project 
well within its own EEZ due to the Chinese concerns.188 Consequently, this suggests that 
Vietnam is not inherently free in its own foreign policy decision making and China 
possesses a significant influence over Hanoi in that regard. Arguably, this type of 
relationship is unlikely to be perceived as balancing anymore. Furthermore, it could hardly 
be described as hedging either, because one of the key characteristics and an important 
advantage of hedging is the relatively greater freedom of choice in terms of foreign policy 
decision making. Vietnam, however, has to face increasing restraints from China due to 
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the China’s growing power projection capabilities, which effectively present Hanoi with 
the only viable foreign policy option, bandwagoning.  
b. Deficiencies of Vietnam’s External Balancing Efforts 
Vietnam’s softened relations with China were accompanied by diminished 
momentum in the U.S.-Vietnamese relations. Vietnam made some efforts to downplay the 
cooperation with the United States. Clearly, the rationale behind this decision was to 
reassure China and avoid unnecessary provocation in order to minimize the risk of facing 
the Chinese threat alone. One of the latest examples of such developments was the 
cancellation by Vietnam of 15 “defense engagement activities” with the United States 
during the last year, including “army, navy and air force exchanges.”189 Moreover, 
Vietnam has refused to participate in the largest U.S.-led military exercise Cobra Gold, a 
signal of the slowing momentum of military-to-military engagement.190 Vietnam also 
refused to upgrade its naval exchanges with America to naval exercises.191 Up until today, 
Hanoi avoids taking part in war games and prefers non-combat scenarios for mutual 
military activities.192 Furthermore, in order to avoid provoking China, Vietnam has 
developed a practice of “briefing” its giant neighbor after the military interactions with the 
United States.193 These examples clearly demonstrate Vietnam’s retreat from keeping the 
high pace of deepening the military cooperation with the United States.  
The major reason for Vietnam’s retreat was the U.S. failure to display the same 
level of readiness for balancing against China as Vietnam had demonstrated. Washington 
used the security dialogue with Hanoi mostly to criticize it over human rights violations, 
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and even banned the arms sale to Vietnam because of these same reasons.194 Moreover, 
the United States left the TPP after Donald Trump took office, sending a very negative 
signal to Hanoi and undermining the U.S. commitment to the region. Confidence in the 
American president significantly declined in Vietnam, from 78% believing in Obama to 
only 58% trusting Trump starting from his first year.195 Hanoi has been gradually forced 
to reevaluate the reliability of its new partner. Trump’s potential disengagement from 
Southeast Asia could have a negative impact on Vietnam’s foreign policy priorities. 
Without clear U.S. support, Vietnam’s balancing policies were fated to fail. 
Vietnam has clearly understood that the United States was in fact the only nation 
that could effectively contain China’s military advancements and actually balance against 
the rising Asian giant. From this perspective, Vietnam’s interests closely overlapped with 
those of the United States.196 Based inherently on this analysis, Vietnam made some 
significant efforts to develop and strengthen its partnership with the United States and 
signaled its readiness to follow the American lead in containing Chinese domination, which 
was a very different approach from Southeast Asian states’ usual hedging policies. The 
United States, however, did not face the same level of threat from China’s rise in the short 
term as the regional nations did. Thus, it could afford the luxury of self-restraint, while 
most of the Southeast Asian states had to deal with the rising Chinese threats on an 
everyday basis. By doing so, the United States failed to manifest its willingness to contain 
China’s rising military capabilities and could not justify the hopes of regional states in 
terms of security. 
Many scholars still mistakenly believe that Washington’s failure to pursue tangible 
responses to China’s military rise must have been positively perceived by Vietnam, due to 
the fact that Southeast Asian states have usually feared entrapment in a great power 
competition and avoided choosing sides.197 These scholars fail to acknowledge that the 
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situation has significantly changed since the 2010s. China’s impressive military 
advancements have weakened the U.S. power projection capability and undermined the 
existing security environment, making hedging policies impractical. Beijing has actually 
succeeded in recent years in limiting the freedom of maneuver of other nations within the 
South China Sea.198 The increasingly powerful revisionist China has continually asked for 
significant concessions, especially demanding regional states to choose sides by pressuring 
them over evolving cooperation with other nations, particularly the United States.199 As a 
result of increasing Chinese pressure and diminishing U.S. commitment, Vietnam was 
forced to alter its clearly developed balancing behavior and limit further elaboration of 
external balancing. 
c. Inadequacy of Internal Balancing 
Strengthening of U.S.-Vietnamese relations certainly was the flagship, but hardly 
the only tool in Vietnam’s balancing toolset. Hanoi had also put considerable emphasis on 
modernizing its armed forces and increasing its own military capabilities. Internal 
balancing, however, does usually have its own limitations for small powers. Despite the 
impressive advancements in modernization efforts, Vietnam’s armed forces are still 
inadequate in comparison to China’s PLA.200 Taking into account the existing imbalance 
between the two, it becomes evident that Vietnam cannot compete with China in terms of 
its military modernization.201 According to the analysis of Derek Grossman, Vietnam is 
incapable of carrying out a full-scale maritime war against Chinese forces, making it reliant 
on the U.S. military presence in the region.202 He suggests that Vietnam’s warfighting 
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doctrine is not yet ready, trainings are not effective, there is a shortfall of awareness 
capacity, and a need for more compatibility in terms of weapon systems.203  
Moreover, Vietnam has failed so far to successfully transform its armed forces into 
a capable naval powereven though the lowered risk of land conflict has long made it 
possible for Vietnam to focus primarily on naval capacity building.204 This shift in focus 
was obviously justified by China’s advancements in naval capabilities and an increase in 
its military posture in the South China Sea.205 Nevertheless, the Vietnamese army still 
maintains its status of major service, and in fact, other services are often viewed as 
supplements to the land forces.206 This thinking is probably the legacy of close military 
ties with the Soviet Union and is justified by the historical experience of the army’s leading 
role in fighting adversaries, but there must be more to that as well. Vietnam clearly 
appreciates the importance of the sea domain; however, it must also acknowledge that 
without the U.S. military presence in South China Sea, Vietnam’s naval forces could never 
guarantee the peace and stability if directly challenged by the Chinese military. Therefore, 
without the clear support of a third party, Hanoi would always be determined to avoid 
direct-armed escalation with China in the South China Sea “at all costs” as it currently 
asserts.207 
d. Why Bandwagoning Instead of Balancing? 
The case of the Philippines demonstrated the U.S. failure to communicate its 
willingness to maintain its commitments to allies. This significantly affected the 
Philippines’ foreign policy. Obviously, the same applies to Vietnam. In fact, Vietnam is 
far more vulnerable in that sense, since it does not even enjoy a formal alliance with the 
United States. Vietnam’s push for more of a balancing approach was primarily based on 
the premise that America had the will and the power to maintain its power projection 
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capabilities throughout the South China Sea and to contain the expansion of Chinese 
military deployments within the territories. Even Hanoi’s focus on modernization of the 
armed forces and defense capacity building could be viewed from the perspective of 
demonstrating itself as an asset for a potential U.S.-Vietnamese alliance. Vietnam has 
clearly tried to demonstrate its willingness to complement the U.S. efforts to restrain China 
in the South China Sea and while doing so apparently made some important steps, shifting 
from hedging to balancing behavior. The U.S.-Vietnamese partnership initially addressed 
the security concerns of Vietnam by highlighting the importance of solving the South China 
Sea disputes for both parties.208 As the effects of Chinese A2/AD increased, however, 
American determination decreased due to the risk averse policies of the United States, 
putting the U.S. will to back its commitments under question and placing Vietnam in a 
position similar to that of the Philippines. Therefore, it is no surprise that Vietnam also 
followed the same pattern and moved to bandwagoning policies. 
The important question to ask is why Vietnam initiated its balancing policies in the 
first place. Unlike the Philippines, Vietnam has never enjoyed a formal alliance with the 
United States. In fact, it has not enjoyed a formal alliance with any other great powers for 
a long time. On the contrary, Vietnam has long practiced the policy of Three Nos, refusing 
to join the alliances; to host military bases of other states; and to prevent the use of its own 
territory by other nations to pursue military operations against third parties.209 These self-
restraint principles are somewhat neutrality focused and limit Vietnam’s space for 
practicing both balancing and bandwagoning policies, a deliberate choice of this medium 
power. How do these principles fit into Vietnam’s foreign policy and occurring shifts? 
Some might argue that these restrictions have limited the U.S.-Vietnamese partnership 
building process in the first place.210 This view implies that Vietnam actually failed to 
back up the promising relationship with the United States, not vice-versa. It is important to 
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realize, however, that these policies are the result of Vietnam’s unique historical experience 
and they should not be regarded as constants when evaluating the contemporary 
developments. By initiating the cooperation with the United States and enhancing the 
partnership in a relatively short time, Vietnam clearly signaled that it was considering 
making strategic adjustments to its foreign policy priorities. With the U.S. failure to meet 
expectations, however, Vietnam was left with no other option than to pull back. Hence, in 
the current arrangement, the Three Nos principles certainly contribute to Vietnam’s 
bandwagoning policies. 
e. Counterargument - Anti-Chinese Sentiments 
One of the most important counterarguments against the claims of the thesis on 
Hanoi’s ongoing bandwagoning with China is the growing anti-Chinese attitudes in 
Vietnamese society. Many scholars have pointed out that the public opinion in Southeast 
Asia is increasingly antagonistic towards China.211 This trend contradicts our finding that 
Vietnam has already relaxed its balancing behavior and has shifted toward bandwagoning. 
The growing anti-Chinese sentiments could be viewed as a reflection of balancing policies. 
Such a judgment, however, is misleading. These sentiments might really be provoked as a 
result of balancing policies, but they do not affect the current decision-making calculus to 
the extent they are often assumed to.  
Many scholars have focused on the increasing role of the public opinion in the 
strategic decision making of Vietnam.212 Some have argued that without public approval 
for the state’s foreign policy even the legitimacy of the government could be threatened, 
suggesting that Vietnam’s government is almost a hostage of its own people’s anti-Chinese 
views.213 The supporters of these arguments point to the examples that demonstrate the 
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growing involvement of the society in the decision-making process. For instance, during 
the 2014 oil rig crisis, intense anti-Chinese protests brought harm to several hundred 
Chinese businesses on Vietnamese territories and pressured the government to follow a 
harder line approach.214 Moreover, Vietnamese society openly challenged the 
government’s decision to grant the Chinese the right to bauxite mining and forced it to 
modify the project.215 These examples reflect the increasing importance of public opinion, 
but we have to acknowledge its limits. Even in these examples, public opinion was not 
decisive. As discussed earlier, during the oil rig crisis, Vietnam pursued a relatively soft 
approach to China anyway. Even in the bauxite mining case, the key components of the 
project actually continued after the government stated that bauxite mining was “a major 
policy of the party and state” and fired only a small number of the Chinese companies, 
mostly a symbolic gesture.216 
The trend of growing anti-Chinese sentiment is real, but it is a product of previously 
analyzed balancing behavior of Vietnam. It is not an independent variable whatsoever. 
Moreover, Vietnam is still a one-party state, with the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) 
in the leading seat. Thus, the system itself limits the influence of public opinion to a great 
extent. Even in democracies, public opinion is not necessarily the leading variable for 
foreign policy formulation. Therefore, the claims that the rise of anti-Chinese sentiments 
could lead to balancing behavior are exaggerated. This is especially evident considering 
the rational structuralist calculus. These attitudes are a product of Vietnam’s previously 
practiced balancing policies and are unlikely to negatively affect the existing shift to 
bandwagoning. 
4. Conclusion 
The analysis of Vietnam’s foreign policy has demonstrated that Vietnam practiced 
hedging as a primary approach during the 1990s and most of the 2000s. The immense 
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advancement in China’s military capabilities, however, challenged the existing balance of 
power within the South China Sea and posed a threat to Vietnam’s security. Therefore, 
Vietnam was forced to alter its long-practiced hedging policy and pursue more active 
balancing against the rising power. Vietnam’s shift to balancing behavior was reflected in 
its intense emphasis on the development of its own military capabilities and the evolution 
of close security and defense ties with the United States. Clearly, the choice in favor of 
balancing was made based on the assumption that America was willing to take the lead in 
containing China’s military advancements in the South China Sea. Vietnam soon found 
that this assumption was somewhat inaccurate, and in the absence of U.S. leadership, Hanoi 
was doomed to suffer the same fate as the Philippines. The absence of a formal alliance 
with the United States made Vietnam’s shifts in strategy less sharp than those of the 
Philippines’; however, in the end Hanoi also followed the same path as Manila did and has 
reverted to a policy more akin to bandwagoning with China. 
D. COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS 
The analysis of the foreign policies of the Philippines and Vietnam in recent 
decades has demonstrated that China’s military advancements have affected those regional 
states’ strategies and pushed them to search for new postures instead of long-enjoyed 
hedging practices. Hedging was their major policy during the 1990s and 2000s; however, 
both have been forced to reject hedging as a no longer viable foreign policy option after 
the development of China’s A2/AD capability posed a challenge to the U.S. military 
posture in the South China Sea and effectively threatened the existing security environment 
of the region. This development called into question the decades-long primacy of the 
United States in the region and has signaled the possible emergence of a bipolar security 
environment. Consequently, the regional states found that practicing hedging strategies had 
become extremely hard, since the system itself pushed them to pick sides between the 
emerging coercive actor and the existing hegemon, a choice they could avoid while China 
was only an economic giant. 
As the analysis demonstrated, in response to the ongoing changes in the security 
architecture of East Asia, both the Philippines and Vietnam abandoned the old practices 
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and shifted to balancing behavior. There were some slight differences in their shifts in 
behavior though. The shift of the Philippines was much more explicit, even though 
considerable evidence was promulgated for the Vietnamese case as well. The Philippines 
proclaimed active balancing and openly promoted anti-Chinese policies, including the case 
against China that Manila brought before the international tribunal court, its own military 
modernization, and most importantly, the strengthening of security ties with the United 
States. Vietnam also started to view China as a threat, put emphasis on defense 
modernization, and made some significant advances in regard to strengthening security ties 
with the United States. Its balancing behavior, however, was more modest compared to the 
Philippines. Based on the characteristic of the two, this variance was very much expected. 
While the Philippines had long enjoyed being a U.S. ally in the region and could always 
rely on American security guarantees, Vietnam’s relations with the United States were 
mostly embryonic and undeveloped. Therefore, even though Vietnam made significant 
efforts to strengthen its security cooperation with the United States, it could not directly 
rely on American security guarantees and was naturally more limited in the extent to which 
it could take its balancing policies. 
The first shift to more balancing behavior was soon followed by a reorientation, 
and both the Philippines and Vietnam have ended up on a more or less clearly defined 
bandwagoning path with China. Again, the reorientation of the Philippines has been much 
sharper and more easily noticeable; nonetheless, one could have observed some 
considerable indications in case of Vietnam as well. As a result of its shift from balancing 
to bandwagoning policies, the Philippines has put an emphasis on deepening its security 
cooperation with China, and even more importantly, has downgraded its military ties with 
the United States. By doing so, the Philippines has clearly demonstrated its willingness to 
not only abandon its balancing policies against China, but also to refuse to return to hedging 
practices, which implied security ties with Washington and economic cooperation with 
Beijing. Vietnam has also moved in the same direction, but with relatively less distinct 
transitions. Hanoi has softened its policies toward China and has downplayed its relations 
with the United States by reducing the pace of developments between the two nations. 
Unlike the Philippines, Vietnam has not performed a 180-degree turnaround, but has 
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nevertheless demonstrated significant changes in its foreign policy approach. The 
difference in the depth of the changes between the Philippines and Vietnam is consistent 
with the hypothesis and broader logic of the thesis. The key driving force behind the change 
from the balancing to bandwagoning policies was the relative decline of the United States 
as a reliable partner for the Southeast Asian nations in the case of hypothetical conflict 
against a militarily rising China. U.S.-Philippines relations were much more mature and 
the Philippines has been more reliant on American security guarantees than Vietnam has 
been, thus Manila has gone further in balancing against China and consequently its 
reorientation to bandwagoning has been more evident. Vietnam, on the other hand, has 
been relatively less reliant on the American military presence in the region and relatively 
modest in balancing against China, thus its reorientation has been more moderate. 
However, its security environment has also been significantly affected by China’s military 
rise and development of A2/AD zones, thus it cannot afford to return to hedging strategies 
due to the same structuralist challenges facing the Philippines.  
The definitions of balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging provided in the previous 
chapters help to clearly differentiate hedging behavior from both the balancing and 
bandwagoning behaviors and vice versa. Nevertheless, a visual demonstration would also 
be helpful in that regard. Thus, the graph in the Figure 4 displays both the hedging path as 
well as balancing-bandwagoning path for the Southeast Asian states and demonstrates the 
substantial differences between these approaches. 
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Figure 4. The Visualization of Balancing, Bandwagoning, and 
Hedging Behaviors 
As the graph demonstrates, the balancing and bandwagoning strategies (the red 
curve) for Southeast Asian states are the opposite sides of the same type of behavior, while 
hedging is very different from both of them and does not simply aim to be the middle point 
between the two. As the red curve displays, in the case of both balancing and 
bandwagoning, increasing ties with one great power essentially leads to decreasing ties 
with other. While the green dashed line indicates that in the case of hedging, increasing ties 
with both great powers at the same time is possible. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has analyzed the responses of key Southeast Asian states, namely the 
Philippines and Vietnam, to China’s immense military modernization and growth and the 
formation of A2/AD zones. The central hypothesis of the thesis has been that China’s 
military rise has challenged the existing status quo in regional security, thus undermining 
the long-established hedging strategies of the regional states and pushing them to shift to 
more of a balancing or bandwagoning behavior.  
In order to test the hypothesis, this thesis first analyzed China’s military 
modernization through the last two decades and the effects of its A2/AD zones on the U.S. 
power projection capabilities. Then the thesis assessed the current U.S. responses to 
evaluate whether American counter-steps were enough to defend the long-enjoyed status 
quo of the U.S. hegemony in the region. Afterward, the thesis addressed the responses of 
the Philippines and Vietnam through detailed case studies of the foreign policies of the two 
over the last 20 years.  
A. KEY CHALLENGES 
This thesis had to face two major challenges during the research phase. The first 
challenge had to do with the nature of hedging practices. Since hedging comprises a very 
flexible strategy, it was difficult to distinguish whether the detected changes in the 
respective foreign policies of the Philippines and Vietnam were really indicators of moving 
away from hedging or if they were actually a part of the hedging strategy itself. In order to 
address this challenge, the thesis has used a clearly defined definition of hedging, based on 
Chien-Peng Chung’s description.217 The thesis has defined hedging as a rational strategy, 
directed at maximizing the security guarantees by engaging the hegemon’s security policies 
in order to enjoy the stability of the unipolar system, while at the same time preserving the 
freedom of action to pursue own national interests of maximizing economic benefit. This 
has suggested that any significant movement toward downgrading the security cooperation 
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with the United States and forming security ties with China would be regarded as a 
bandwagoning posture. On the other hand, if these regional states put major emphasis on 
strengthening security cooperation with the United States or invited more U.S. presence in 
the region, and limited their interactions with China in the political-economic dimension 
would be regarded as balancing behavior against China.  
The second challenge had to do with the quantitative data. Most of the data on the 
military expenditures of the Southeast Asian states does not indicate any form of balancing 
from the regional nations, while the detailed case studies demonstrated that the balancing 
behavior has actually taken place by both the Philippines and Vietnam for several years. 
On the other hand, this challenge with the quantitative data is not been new and was 
anticipated. The discrepancy posed by the data is attributed to the fact that this data can 
only demonstrate the internal dimension of balancing; however, due to the extreme power 
imbalance between China and other Southeast Asian states, internal balancing by those 
states is not a viable option, and thus is hardly practiced. The only form of balancing that 
these states can afford is an external balancing, which cannot be traced within domestic 
variables, such as defense spending. Instead, it should be discovered through a detailed 
analysis of these regional states’ foreign policies, the strategy this thesis has applied. 
B. MAJOR FINDINGS 
Through the analysis of China’s military advances, U.S. reactions, and the 
responses of the Philippines and Vietnam, this thesis has elaborated some major findings.  
First, China’s military rise and formation of A2/AD zones, in conjunction with its 
gray zone strategy, have undermined the American power projection capability throughout 
the region, which poses a threat to U.S. primacy and effectively erodes the long-enjoyed 
security environment of the region. China’s success has ultimately weakened America’s 
credibility in the region and has questioned the United States’ reliability as an ally and 
security provider during a potential conflict with China from the perspective of the regional 
states. 
Second, the United States has acknowledged the emerging threats and has 
developed several strategic concepts to address the challenge, such as the AirSea Battle, 
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the JAM-JC, and the JCIC. These concepts, however, are hardly adequate due to their lack 
of a strategic level overarching policy focused on increasing military spending, enlarging 
military deployments in the region, and enhancing military interactions with the regional 
states.  
Third, these developments have contributed to an emerging bipolarity and power 
competition in the region, thus effectively pushing the Southeast Asian states to abandon 
hedging strategies and making them choose sides between the competing actors. Hedging, 
long enjoyed by most of the regional states, was only possible because the system was 
largely unipolar and the Southeast Asian nations were not forced to pick sides. Therefore, 
they were able to develop close relations with both the United States and China in their 
own unique ways. China’s increased military capability and the relative decline of U.S. 
access capability to the region due to China’s successful establishment of A2/AD zones, 
has introduced a substantially new reality, where the hedging strategy has become 
irrelevant and impractical. 
Fourth, the initial responses from both the Philippines and Vietnam to China’s rise 
were shifts to more of a balancing stance. They have both acquired balancing policies 
against China and tried to rely on the U.S. support to enforce these policies. The internal 
balancing options for the Southeast Asian states, on the other hand, are very limited; thus, 
they are highly reliant on an external ally to follow the balancing path for a long period. 
Fifth, the lack of U.S. interest in directly opposing China’s military aggression in 
the region and its unwillingness to escalate the tensions with Beijing by directly 
confronting China by force over the interests of allies and partners have led both the 
Philippines and Vietnam to overhaul their foreign policy preferences and make a reversal 
toward bandwagoning behavior. These changes were anticipated, as these states’ respective 
balancing stance was doomed anyway without strong external support. 
Sixth, even though both the Philippines and Vietnam share the same path in foreign 
policy shifts, they have faced some differences as well, namely the extent to which Vietnam 
pushed both balancing and bandwagoning policies was relatively weak compared to the 
Philippines. The reason for this was the difference in their relations with the United States. 
78 
The Philippines has long been a U.S. ally and has enjoyed the U.S. security umbrella. 
Consequently, it pushed much harder during its balancing phase and had to reverse course 
a long ways during its shift to bandwagoning. Vietnam, by contrast, had relatively small-
scale defense cooperation with the United States and had been a more independent regional 
military power for decades. Thus, its reliance on U.S. security guarantees was limited. 
Therefore, its push toward both balancing and bandwagoning behavior was more moderate 
than that of the Philippines. 
Seventh, both the Philippines and Vietnam have ended up on the bandwagoning 
path with China, and as time goes, their bandwagoning behavior seems only like to 
strengthen due to China’s continued military advancements. The only possibility that could 
reverse this trend in the future is if the United States makes a political decision to take a 
more active stance toward the region and pursues more tangible containment policies 
against China. 
C. IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS 
The major findings of this thesis imply that small powers can hardly refuse 
bandwagoning with rising great powers without strong support from external actors. From 
the U.S. perspective, this finding is helpful in deciding on the wide spectrum of foreign 
policy decisions starting from isolationism and ending with deep engagement. According 
to the findings of this thesis, small powers cannot practice internal balancing against 
emerging actors for long without foreign assistance, even if they want to, as they usually 
have less or no capacity to do so. Thus, their balancing policies are doomed to fail without 
a reliable external ally. From the U.S. perspective, this suggests more active foreign policy 
and ends up on the deep-engagement side of the spectrum, indeed. From the American 
perspective, the findings of the thesis clearly argue against leaving security vacuums, since 
emerging actors have the opportunity to gather a great number of followers such as 
bandwagoning states in the absence of external (U.S.) involvement, potentially posing an 
existential threat to U.S. interests in the future. 
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D. RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis has analyzed how Southeast Asian states have responded to China’s 
military rise and formation of A2/AD zones. Nevertheless, the conclusions, developed as 
a result of the analysis, are hardly unique to a particular region. The thesis has elaborated 
sufficiently clear definitions to outline the basic characteristics of the researched 
phenomenon, in order to provide a functioning model. This creates an opportunity to 
generalize its conclusions and potentially apply them to other similar regions and actors. 
One particular relevant and interesting current example of similar developments would be 
Russia’s military advancements and formation of its A2/AD zones within the Black Sea 
region, and the responses of other regional states to these actions. It would be interesting 
to test whether the major findings of this thesis hold and are actually transferrable to the 
case of Russia’s military rise and the reactions of the Black Sea regional states 
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